

Zionism, the Occidentalization of the Jew, and the Silencing of Palestinian History

We are in the Orient only geographically.
David Ben-Gurion 1949

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Rather than viewing Zionism as a Jewish nationalist movement that broke off with European nations so as to create their own state, this paper argues that it is more accurate to describe Israel as an assimilationist state that appropriates the racial classifications in European social Darwinism so as to remove those Jewish characteristics that the anti-Semite found most appalling. As we will see, the European anti-Semite's identification of the Jew as Oriental must have been quite unsettling for this emerging Zionist movement, and it was to this concept of the Jew as outsider that Zionism aimed to change. The consequences of this cannot be underestimated. In defining themselves in opposition to the Orient and as part of the Occident will have major repercussions for the lives of not only European Jews but with both the Eastern Jew and the now very Orientalized Arab. Zionists thus took it upon themselves to embrace and adopt the Western racist discourse about the "Oriental Other" by strategically placing the Jew and his interests as European.

The influence and penetration of European Orientalist thought, the Enlightenment, and Western articulations of race on Western Jewish intellectual developments, I contend, initiated this process by which a minority of European Jewry in the nineteenth century appropriated the ontological framework of East/West and used it to overturn the longstanding European legacy of categorizing the Jew as "Oriental." This overturning was an essential aspect of the Zionist movement, one that solidified, and made possible, the almost commonsensical notion today of a Judeo-Christian civilization, a term that would not have been possible until very recently. It was a complete rupture in which the Jew was dislodged from the east to which the anti-Semite had classified him and repositioned as a representative of an Occidental, Western civilization. Jews thus came to be seen as "outside" of their "Oriental" location and placed as an organic component of the "West." As Kalmar and Penslar have argued, "to many Zionists the *realpolitik* of alliances with *goyim* [non-Jews] was never more than a means to realize a radical . . . physical exit to the Orient . . . as a means of becoming a 'normal,' i.e., Western-style, nation." Deploying this strategy places Jewish nationalists as colonizers who, ironically, throw "off the yoke of gentile domination while assuming a *mission civilisatrice* to revivify an allegedly barren land as a means to regenerating the Jewish people."ⁱ

We will begin this essay with first tracing the anti-Semitic gaze and then analyzing its effects on the racial political articulation of Jewish nationalist elites and the eventual formation of Zionism. As in the mind of many Orientalist today who write about Muslims, the Jewish people, until recently in the last century, were not allowed to cross the bridge into modernity

and were viewed as frozen in time belonging to the Biblical era. The debates that Jews encountered in modern Europe on whether or not their religion or race was up to par with modern Christian Europe, as we will discuss in this chapter, placed them outside the gates of civilization and produced many debates about how and if they could be permitted to enter into the more advanced parts of the world. Yet in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel, Jews were permitted to finally take a seat along with the other “advanced” civilizations. How this came about will be this chapter’s topic of concern.

I Anti-Semitism and the Jew as Non-European

Christians in the “West” and Europe historically have had difficulty accepting the Jew as an insider. It needs to be noted here that many European Christians identified the Jew as essentially a radically alien, Oriental outcast living in the midst of a Western world. A case in point is the nineteenth century debate that emerged around Disraeli’s policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Disraeli’s attempt to delay the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was seen by his British Parliament opponents as “Jewish” because they felt that, as a Jew, he was bound to rally automatically to the Turkish side. Nissim Rejwan, the author of a recent book that deals with this topic, makes the comment about this incident that is to the point: “A Jew, even a baptized Jew, they argued, remained an Oriental, and therefore, in the struggle over the Eastern Question, Disraeli’s loyalties were necessarily with Asia against Europe, with Islam against Christendom.”ⁱⁱ He cites at length one of Disraeli’s most bitter opponent, T.P. O’Connor:

[T]here has been among large sections of the Jews the strongest sympathy with the Mohammedan peoples. . . . In the time of the Crusaders, the Jews were the friends who aided the Mohammedans in keeping back the tide of Christian invasion which was floating against the East, and in Spain the Jews were the constant friends and allies of the Moorish against the Christian inhabitants of the country. [Disraeli’s] general view then upon this question of Turkey is that as a Jew he is a kinsman of the Turk, and that, as a Jew, he feels bound to make common cause with the Turk against the Christian.ⁱⁱⁱ

The equation of the Jew with the Orient was so taken for granted that a British author of an 1877 book could confidently complain “Throughout the East, the Turk and the Jew are leagued against the Christian . . . Throughout Europe, the most friendly Turkish part of the press is largely in Jewish hands. It may be assumed everywhere, with the smallest class of exceptions, that the Jew is the friend of the Turk and the enemy of the Christians.”^{iv} Major European intellectual figures shared these same ideas. Herder, for example, calls the Jew “an Asiatic people alien to our continent.” Schopenhauer extended this anti-Semitic idea by claiming “they are and remain an alien, oriental people, and must therefore count only as resident aliens.” Sombart later would appropriate this into his own work by calling the Jews “an Oriental folk transplanted into an environment both climatically and ethnically strange, wherein their best powers came to fruition.” Many Jews residing in Europe also accepted this very same anti-Semitic notion. Walter Rathenau, for instance, perceived the Jewish people residing in Europe as “an Asiatic horde on the sands of the Mark.”^v Similarly the Jewish Arnold Zweig accepted the fundamental description of the Jew in the anti-Semitic notion that Jews are unsuited to European life: “We cannot do without Asia. We shall never be redeemed until we are back home there.” For him, a Jew assimilated to Europe has

betrayed Asia, “the inner Orient in which he is rooted.”^{vi} In his book, *The Face of the Eastern Jew*, Arnold Zweig further expands on this idea by arguing that the customs and habits of Jews found to be strange in the Occident can only be intelligible if seen as Oriental: “anyone who was ever allowed into a mosque in an Islamic country during prayer will recognize the Jew as an Oriental.”^{vii}

The liberal philosopher Voltaire concurred by arguing that “the [ancient] Jews were vagrant Arabs infested with leprosy.”^{viii} Max Naumann in his treatise on the Jewish question some years later also made the claim that Jews maintained “moral views of sub-Asia foreign to the German spirit” and warned his fellow Christian citizens that Jews threatened the integrity and health of their German values.^{ix} Such views included intellectuals and political writers who were advocates of Jewish integration, like the Christian Wilhelm Dohm who identified Jews as a “nation” of “unfortunate Asiatic refugees.”^x Karl W. F. Grattenauer, a German Lawyer, in his popular pamphlet, *Wider die Juden* (1803), explained that the most learned and enlightened of the Jews “may talk about Goethe, Schiller, and Schlegel all they please; they nonetheless remain an alien Asiatic people.”^{xi} As Isenberg has recently observed, “Jews [were] viewed within the basic framework of the *shtetl* as a kind of ‘oriental’ landscape,” as was the case with German soldiers who were placed in Eastern Europe and noted that being there was “as if they had ‘entered a totally different world of the Orient’.”^{xii}

To many European Christians, Jews inhabited a life of a by-gone age that is unprepared for the modern world. The invention of the “compulsory ghetto” that they were forced into functioned not unlike that of John Stuart Mill’s version of the waiting room of history, where Jews were “typically subject to strict population control and a multitude of economic and legal restrictions designed to keep them apart from, and under the control of, the Christian majority.”^{xiii} But unlike the colonial overseas possessions that Mill was referring to, in the case of European Jews it was an internal colonization where “the Jews were cut off by the walls of the ghetto as though stricken with some loathsome disease that might carry misery and death unto others.”^{xiv} Ever since the sixteenth century, if not earlier, Jews were regularly isolated to such a degree that they developed a distinctive language and culture, making it easier for Christian Europeans to mark them off as a primitive Other who is alien to the more advanced European Christian civilization.

Germany of the late eighteenth century is a prime example of this internal colonization and how it was expressed in the “Jewish question.” Elite German and French intellectuals inquired about the possibility of permitting Jews political and social emancipation, but with the understanding that Jews would “‘prove their fitness for equal rights,’ by shedding their ‘backward’ traditions, dismantling their separate communal infrastructures, and moving forward into ‘modernity’.”^{xv} Like the Orientalism that has long defined how Western scholars, statesmen, and men of letters understood and constructed the Muslim Other, we see the proliferation in the late eighteenth century of “knowledge” production by an army of writers, philosophers, and theologians creating a mass textual representation of Jews, all ruminating “on the possibility of a moral, political and physical ‘regeneration’ of the Jews and grappled with the question of how participation in a modern, secular state could ever be compatible with the Jews’ stubborn adherence to an antiquated, Oriental [Judaic] religion”^{xvi} As Aziza Khazzoom explains: “Christians demanded that Jews . . . reform their lifestyle, values, and social, economic, and educational structures. Friends and foes alike were disgusted by their dark, disorderly ghettos . . . Jewish appearance, particularly the beards and sidelocks, were attacked.”^{xvii}

What is most telling of these reflections on Jews is how European Christians position contemporary Jews into the time of the “Old” Testament. In the same way that nineteenth-

century Christian Europeans represented Arabs as Bedouins, Jews too belong to a childhood age to which European Christians, standing in as the adults, pronounce the Other as stuck in a period preceding the great rupture represented in the coming of a new society by the figure of Jesus Christ. Herder, for instance, in his essay on Jewish history, describes Jews of his time with Biblical Judaism^{xviii} where Jews are textually reproduced as living-day remnants of the Biblical era who, because they failed to hear and follow the message of Christ, have been “superseded by the victory of Aryan, Indo-European culture.”^{xix} From there it is easy to conclude that the reason Jews are placed in a time and place incongruent with their actual development is largely due to Judaism itself.

The German Jacob Friedrich Fries contributed to precisely this idea by arguing that Judaism, because it belongs to an era that has long been made archaic with the coming of Christ, needs to be abolished in order for the Jews to cross the bridge into civilization. Hence, neither reforming their religion nor changing their environment will Jews be placed on the track of progress. As Pasto paraphrases Fries conclusion: “‘Judaism’ was the real obstacle to Jewish emancipation. . . . Judaism had no place in present German society because it was a ‘remnant from a primitive time which one should not merely restrict but completely wipe out. The civil situation of the Jews will improve exactly when Judaism is wiped out.’”^{xx} Moving forward in time and being allowed a place in European Christian civilization will only be possible once Jews stop clinging to a doctrine long outdated by a more enlightened Christianity.

For many Jews, especially the assimilated, living in Europe and being exposed to this insult was a very difficult reality to experience. The constant negative images, including the non-ending debates about whether or not they were up to par with “real” Europeans, and especially being marked and stigmatized as Oriental, caused many of them to internalize the anti-Semitic gaze and produce within their communities movements that had as their goal to de-Orientalize and produce a “new Jew.”

In some cases, West European Jews dealt with this by claiming that it was the Eastern Jew that remained Oriental while they, living and being exposed to Western culture, have been completely Occidentalized. There were multiple ways of dealing with this anti-Semitic gaze. A particularly stunning response by some European Jews was to use the preferred Biblical account of the anti-Semite towards the Jews of the East. With some editing, they took the narrative Biblical structure of Christian Biblical scholars and added the adjective *Ostjuden*. Nowhere was this more effectively utilized by Western Jews than the legend of the “Lost tribes of Israel,” where they replaced the universal category of Jews of the anti-Semite and replaced it with the Yemenite and Oriental Jews, which were now designated as “the ‘lost brothers’ from a far distant biblical era, for whom time had stopped and in whom ancient traditions were preserved as they were.” As Manor has suggested, these Ashkenazi Jews made claims that sounded suspiciously like their anti-Semitic predecessors, as in this example by the Jewish scholar Eliezer Ben-Yahuda: “we still find among them the social condition of Israel as it was at the time of *mishna*,” suggesting that Oriental Jews, rather than Ashkenazi Jews, were the one’s who were trapped and lingered in an earlier time.^{xxi} Indeed, as Manor further argues, for these Ashkenazi Jews, “Arab and oriental Jews from Jerusalem seemed to preserve a biblical way of life.”^{xxii} In such accounts, the Mizrahim, as these Arab Jews would later be called after the establishment of Israel, were now “perceived as upholding the ancient traditions . . . [with] the oriental Jews in Zionist discourse [becoming] ‘The Jews’ in Christian theology.”^{xxiii}

But those more sympathetic to Eastern Jews had yet another way with dealing with the anti-Semite. Arnold Zweig, a Jew who was indeed attracted to the “oriental” qualities of Eastern

Jews, constantly made a distinct opposition between the inauthentic Western Jew with that of Eastern Jewry. For him, the Eastern Jew is characterized as defying “modern, (i.e., western) conceptions of time: he remains suspended in mythical and literary realm . . . He is a figure of utter simplicity, of premodern grace and spiritual guidance, of authenticity and naturalness.” The Eastern Jew, for Zweig, is spatially and temporally distant from Western Jews, “removed from the *jetztzeit* (newness) of European big-city life.”^{xxiv} Notice how in the following excerpt from his book, *The Face of the Eastern Jew*, how he uses time to differentiate Eastern, Oriental Jews from Western Jews:

He turns his eye away from me and into the distance, a distance that is nothing but time. His profile leads like a waterfall into his beard, which dissolves into spray and clouds . . . And his gaze draws upon itself a distance about which we know, and is nothing but time. Is this the Jew of the East? Is he an old man, who, *almost entirely removed from the present day and certainly removed from the future*, lives a life that is limited to the most oppressed and narrowest form, a life that scatters itself once the pressure that forced it into that form lets up? *We know that our forefathers were relatives of the men we find today in the cities of Lithuania, Poland, and Galicia*; we know that they lived in the Franconian hill regions and the German plains like us. Thus, today we speak different languages, think different thoughts, live a different kind of Judaism, eat different dishes, measure according to different standards, and we [Occidental Jews] have traded part of our soul with Europe, giving up part of our Jewishness. In not quite five generations it has shaped us, this European fate and its freedom, its new air, its wonderful and artistic values, its integrating and liberating aura.^{xxv}

While Christian Biblical scholars imagined their contemporary Jews as frozen in a time and place of millenniums past, Zweig similarly gazes at Lithuanian and Polish Jews as living contemporaries of what Western Jews were many centuries ago.

In other instances, assimilated Jews would turn to a more self-hating type of response, one which obsessively attempts to free itself from any oriental contamination. Walter Rathenau, in his 1897 essay “*Hore, Israel*,” for instance, asks his fellow German Jews to accept the anti-Semite’s accusations of Jews and to finally leave behind all of their oriental ways:

Look at yourselves in the mirror! This is the first step toward self-criticism. Nothing unfortunately, can be done about the fact that all of you look frighteningly alike . . . Neither will it console you that in the first place your east Mediterranean appearance is not very well appreciated by the northern tribes.... As soon as you recognize [these faults] you will resolve to dedicate a few generations to the renewal of your outward appearance.^{xxvi}

It is in this self-hating tradition that Zionism and its brand of Jewish nationalism was born. The negative energy that was produced through anti-Semitism was the same energy that fed and nourished the Zionist movement itself. Zionism was the response to Rathenau’s call to look in the mirror and wipe out all blemishes that made them negatively stand out and be detested by European Christians. To that end, Zionism’s major objective was to “regenerate” the Jew by freeing themselves from the grips of Jewish traditions, manners, and customs that kept them from progressing forward and “destroyed their people’s potential for technical and scientific progress.”^{xxvii}

II

Theodor Herzl and the Desire

for an Occidentalizing Jewish State

Zionism as practiced by its best known proponents, in their response to a European anti-Semitic conception which posited the Jew as alien to Europe and belonging to an Oriental race, was strategically positioned to resolve the outsider status of the Jew, to transform the Jew from an Oriental other to a respectable and civilized inhabitant of “Western civilization.” In the case of every Zionist leader, as will be shown below, the objective was to search for ways by which the Jew could look and feel European, shed his Oriental skin, and receive an entrance ticket into European civilization. Indeed it was the concept of the Jew as outsider that the early Zionists aimed to change, to finally be accepted by the anti-Semite. This would all come at a price, for in the process of creating this “new Jew” meant the repression and removal of all those elements that were viewed by Zionists to be tainted with the East.

This racial episteme was first seriously considered only by a small circle of Jews, especially among those who were highly attracted to being integrated into Germany and other European countries, but who soon were convinced that emancipation would not be forthcoming and that the only way to be accepted into the club of the moderns would be to find a land which they could settle and prove that Jews too could finally shed their oriental qualities and leave behind all vestiges of medieval culture. Obsessed with the need to create a new culture, they decided on a path that rather than challenges the anti-Semite instead would demonstrate that Jews too, if given the chance, can be lifted from the degenerated state that they now find themselves in.

This assimilation can be clearly observed in Zionism’s best known personality, Theodor Herzl. Viewed by many today as the founding father of Zionism, his life work seems to have been marked by an obsession to resolve the otherness of the Jew, to find a new mode of assimilation that would bring Jews self-respect and honor in the eyes of Gentiles.^{xxviii} Boyarin is correct to conclude that “Herzl had come to the conclusion that anti-Semitism was essentially justified by the behavior of the Jews, especially of course the despised *Ostjuden*, and that only a radical act of self-transformation would win the esteem of Christendom for his degenerate compatriots.” His main disagreement, however, was with those anti-Semites like Michaelis and others who viewed Jews as inherently unchangeable. Indeed, Herzl agreed with all of the charges that the anti-Semites of his day leveled against Jews, including “charges of crookedness, lack of ethical seriousness, and parasitism,” and wanted to demonstrate that all of these were “entirely the product of the Jewish environment.”^{xxix}

The rejection of Jews by Europe was thus viewed as a natural consequence of the failure of the Jews to emancipate themselves from the time and space of the East, and it would take a state to develop their own society that would give them the means to travel out of the Orient and out of their feudal-like condition. In order to negate this European rejection and to solve this Jewish dilemma, therefore, Herzl viewed it as essential to create a state in which Jews could finally pull themselves out of an Oriental-like existence.

The resolution of this Jewish dilemma came to him in the notion of the Jewish state. To remake the Jew on a Gentile model, and finally to solve the “Jewish Question,” Herzl proposed the notion of a separate and independent Jewish state. He blamed the fact that Jews had been despised and entangled in a web of Oriental-like characteristics on their statelessness.^{xxx} In Daniel Boyarin’s telling words,^{xxxi} “For Herzl it seems to have been ultimately the vulgarity of the Jews and the way that it prevented their full acceptance by the gentile elites that disturbed him.” For Herzl, the central objective of creating a future state was not only to emancipate the Jews from the grip of the ghetto, pogroms, and other forms

of persecution, but also to create and fashion a new Jew on the model of a European: “I understand what anti-Semitism is about,” he declares, and goes on to argue:

We Jews have maintained ourselves . . . as a foreign body among the various nations. In the ghetto we have taken on a number of anti-social qualities. Our character has been corrupted by oppression, and it must be restored through some other kind of pressure. . . . All these sufferings rendered us ugly and transformed our character which had in earlier times been proud and magnificent.^{xxxii}

Only with the creation of a modern state could the Jew finally be recognized as the equal of his European colleagues. After the election of 1895 in Vienna, for instance, Herzl declared: “In the election the majority of non-Jewish citizens – no, all of them – declare that they do not recognize us as Austro-Germans . . . All right, we shall move away; but over there, too, we shall only be Austrians.”^{xxxiii} This inverted logic made much sense to Herzl, for it captured his desire to be accepted by his beloved Germans. As a contemporary biographer of Herzl explains, “Only by evacuating Europe would Herzl come to be recognized as an Austro-German. Concurrently, only by leaving would Jewish bitterness toward their European homelands dissipate and turn once more into love.”^{xxxiv} “The anti-Semites will become,” Herzl declares, “our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies.”^{xxxv} Departing from Europe, therefore, was Herzl’s way not of renouncing Europe and claiming his difference from the German and European self, but rather of identifying as a European in order to eliminate once and for all the distinction between Jew and Gentile. Kornberg’s remarks on Herzl are telling in this respect: “Even spit and polish ‘Aryans’ now admired Jews.”^{xxxvi} The new Jewish state, as Herzl envisioned it, would not make a decisive break with Europe. On the contrary, its establishment would bring Jews respect and would initiate a new era of “forgiveness, peace, and reconciliation” between Gentile and Jew. The solution that Herzl would devise to bring this about is what has become now called Zionism.^{xxxvii} Notice the systematic way in which Herzl projects the Jew into the European, civilized, modern construct and always at the expense of the “Oriental” other, a strategy that we see in the very similar case of the Irish immigrants upon entering the U.S. in the nineteenth-century when, as Ignatiev reminds us in his *How the Irish Became White*, they constructed themselves in opposition to the black slaves in an assimilationist project “to enter the white race . . .”^{xxxviii} Herzl and the movement that has come to be known through his work as Zionism clearly positioned the Jew as a member of the Occident and sharing no qualities with the Oriental and thinking of himself and his interests as European.^{xxxix} By fusing the Jew with the German/ European/ Western/civilized amalgam, Zionism established a precedent that would help cement its newly acclaimed Occidental status.^{xl}

Indeed, all of the founding fathers, from Herzl, Weisman, and Jabotinsky to Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, would share these same tendencies to produce a Jew in the Orient that assimilated not into the region they moved into but to a far away continent. Like his predecessor, Jabotinsky, writing in a 1927 article with the title “The Arabesque Fashion,” he declared, “We are going to the land of Israel in order to advance Europe’s moral boundaries to the Euphrates.”^{xli} For Jabotinsky, as it was for Herzl, the “East was a primitive expression of Western culture—the historical equivalent of Europe of the Middle Ages.”^{xlii} Marcus Ehrenpreis, in his discussion of the new Hebrew literature, similarly asserts: “Aspiring to a national Renaissance in our historical homeland does not mean that we wish to be Asian again. We are Jews but European Jews; hence our culture, which is an extension of ourselves, must be both national and European.”^{xliii} David Ben Gurion highlighted this in

the founding of Israel in 1948: “We do not want Israelis to become Arabs. We are today bound to fight against the spirit of the Levant.”^{xliv}

Joseph Massad sums up this Zionist tendency quite lucidly: “The objective of the Zionist movement was not simply to transplant European Jews into a new geographical area, but also to transform the very nature of European Jewish society and identity as it had existed in the diaspora until then.”^{xlv} Zionism is the effort by Jewish nationalists to negate all that was considered Oriental while at the same to narrate Jewish identity as congruent with modern Euro-civilization. The actual act of moving from West to East, ironically, is the path through which Jews can finally overthrow their “Eastern-ness.”

In this way, the state of Israel would come to be seen as a floating space in an ocean of barbarism, one that was somehow geographically located in the Orient while remaining in Europe. Although embedded physically in the hard, tough soil of the East, its *Geist* was somehow oblivious of this environment, belonging instead to “Western Civilization.” Ben Gurion’s statement that “the State of Israel is a part of the Middle East only in geography” recalls the image, described by G.H. Jansen, “of the hydroponically-reared plant, its roots floating in a chemical solution, not embedded in the earth.”^{xlvi} The problem, however, is that Israel is on earth, just not in the Orient according to Zionists like Herzl.

III

Zionism and the Silencing of the Arab Other

ZIONISM AND THE PROJECT TO MAKE PALESTINIANS INVISIBLE

Zionism thus sees itself on a civilizing mission, first and foremost directed by European Jews at other Jews and only then at “whatever natives happens to be there, if indeed, these natives are noticed at all.”^{xlvii} By settling in what they assumed to be an ocean of barbarism, they tirelessly worked to negate their “Oriental” stigma and constructed an identity that is informed by European supremacy over the “Oriental.” For Zionism’s most significant thinkers, they are a nation like France and Germany, radically unlike the “Oriental” inhabitants of the region they wish to settle. The resolution of the “Jewish Question,” for Jewish Zionists and their European Allies, is thus resolved by placing the Jew as a race and nation of their own while still holding on to the idea that he is a member of the Western/civilized world. It is by this method that Jewish Zionism would transform the Jew from being outside of the Western concept of the self to one inside. The policy that they devised to produce this new Jew is three-fold: The first was what they called the “conquest of land and labor,” by which they meant the establishment of farming and agricultural settlements of Jews free from native Arabs where Palestinians would slowly be made landless and thus forced to leave their land and communities. The second was aimed at Arab Jews and at times referred to as “the magic carpet ride” in which Jews brought in from Arab countries would be cleansed, through educational and other “civilizing” modes, from their Oriental pollutants so as to make them fit for a European like society. The last and most significant policy was to marginalize all traces of Palestinian life in the Holy land by silencing the historical and archeological record of long-standing non-Jewish communities in traditional Palestine.

The conquest of land and labor was the policy of the early Jewish settlers. Although the official establishment of Israel would have to wait until half a century after Herzl’s death in 1948, there already begun a process of changing facts on the ground in Palestine from the late nineteenth century to its creation. Indeed, the process is still going on today as Israel is

continuing its policies of appropriating Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem and the West Bank by converting them to massive Jewish only settlements, slowly caging in Palestinians to ever decreasing plots of real estate. This strategy depended on a three-tiered structure, in which Ashkenazi (European) Jews were the most preferred candidates for citizenship, the Mizrahim (Arab or “Oriental”) Jews as second in line since they are assimilable, with Palestinians as least desirable since they were now cast as Israel’s inassimilable Other.^{xlvi} In this display of power to conquer the land from the indigenous Palestinian people, the settlers produced the highly racialized communal farms known popularly as the *kibbutzim*. Under the guise of a Socialist utopia, these were “Jews only” cooperatives and accepted “no employment of outside labor.”^{xlvii} Consequently, the Zionist movement, following an agenda of complete segregation from its inception, created a “dual society” with an economic development policy devised to construct territorial partition and an employment program designed to refuse Palestinians jobs and create exclusively Jewish *kibbutzim*. As Theodor Herzl, the founding father of Zionism, proclaimed:

We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries while denying it employment in our own country....Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.¹

Such policies were based on the precepts that David Ben-Gurion had articulated in his statement that “Land with Arabs on it and land without Arabs on it are two very different types of land.”^{li} These ideas informed the Zionist colonies and were a major characteristic by which the Zionist entity maneuvered to displace native Palestinians from their land. As Raz-Krakotzkin suggests, “the dominant culture was established on the basis of distinguishing itself sharply from the actual Arab, and negating Arab history and present . . . [by] the total negation of the destruction of Palestinian entity and the ethnic cleansing that was associated with the establishment of the state of Israel.”^{lii}

As such, Jews and Arab Palestinians were strictly segregated so as not to mix, in a sense recreating the same ghetto structure that the anti-Semite applied to Jews in Europe, with the added element of slowly displacing the Palestinian with Jews. As a result, Palestinians were not only spatially isolated from Jews, but were administered by settler and, later, Israeli authorities so as to prepare them for eventual political and legal disenfranchisement. In order for this segregation and removal policy to work, moreover, the Zionist movement had to make sure Jews and Arabs would not assimilate into one compound, but kept apart culturally, spatially, and temporally. Remember that Zionism envisioned European Jews traveling East in order to create a new Occidental Jew, one that was although located in the Orient would remain distinct and superior to his and her surroundings. As a result, like their anti-Semitic predecessors, Zionists “developed a range of attitudes toward the Orient and toward the Arabs” where Jews were racially far “above” and temporally more “advanced” than the Arab hordes who surrounded them.^{liii} Besides labor and land policy, Zionist developed other programs and strategies to produce a racial, spatial, and temporal divide, as in the decision to use Hebrew as the new language of the new Jew as well as other cultural distinctions like music and art. As Jabotinsky insisted before the establishment of the state, Jews need to do all they can to set them self apart from the people they are conquering, including the accent by which they spoke Hebrew, as he had argued in his essay entitled “The Hebrew Accent”:

There are experts who think that we ought to bring our accent closer to the Arabic accent. But this is a mistake. Although Hebrew and Arabic are Semitic languages, it does not mean our Fathers spoke in [an] 'Arabic accent' . . . We are European and our musical taste is European, the taste of Rubinstein, Mendelssohn, and Bizet.^{liv}

It was this combination of Jewish settlement policy with novel racialized representations of Jews as "advanced" and Arabs as a temporally and spatially distant Oriental Other that served to provide a dramatic shift in social relations between the now segregated two populations. Zionist approval of using once anti-Semitic claims on Jews towards Arabs would further fan flames as the movement enacted a series of "Judaization" projects, all while simultaneously "de-Arabizing" the land.

In the very first weeks after the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948, we see the initial massive flight of some 700,000 panic-stricken Arabs, who abandoned their homes, villages, and farms after the massacres of Deir Yassin, with the hope of returning upon the end of the conflict. Many of these Arabs believed that they would soon return but in the end remained, as many continue to do so today, as refugees as a result of Israel's refusal to allow them to return for the sake of maintaining a Jewish majority in a land they now call their own. It was in this context of emptying the land of its initial inhabitants that Israel proceeded to "make the desert bloom," making sure to leave not a trace by the expelled Palestinians, including their 418 Palestinian villages, all of which were destroyed to the very last stone.^{lv} As Israel Shahak wrote,

The Truth about Arab settlement which used to exist in the area of the State of Israel before 1948, is one of the most guarded secrets of Israeli life. No publication, book or pamphlet gives either [the] number [of Arab villages] or their location. This of course is done on purpose, so that the accepted official myth of "an empty country" can be taught and accepted in the Israeli schools and told to visitors . . . This falsification is specially grave in my opinion, as it is accepted almost universally, outside the Middle East, and because the destroyed villages were—in almost all cases—destroyed completely, with their houses, garden walls, and even cemeteries and tombstones, so that literally a stone does not remain standing, and visitors are passing and being told that "it was all desert."^{lvi}

Indeed, as the Palestinian scholar Joseph Massad informs us, "For Palestine to be 'a land without people for a people without a land,' the Israelis expelled the majority of the Palestinians to render their vision a reality."^{lvii}

But while they completely destroyed hundreds of Palestinian villages, many more villages containing large numbers of well-to-do homes remained standing, many of which were repossessed by Israeli authorities and redistributed to army and political officials, while others were either looted or giving away to new Jewish settlers. Some of these lootings were of such large scale that even high officials commented upon them, as with the following official: "The only thing that surprised me . . . [was] the mass robbery in which all parts of the population participated . . . Soldiers who entered abandoned houses in towns and villages they occupied grabbed whatever they could. Some took the stuff for themselves, others 'for the boys' or for the kibbutz. They stole household effects, cash, heavy equipment, trucks and whole flocks of cattle. . . . 'From Lydda alone the army took out 1,800 truck-loads of property'."^{lviii} The looting by Jewish settlers and soldiers alike spread from town to town as it was replicated throughout Palestine, at times taking on quite gruesome turns, as when a number of Jewish looters entered a town and proceeded to "forcibly remove rings from the

fingers and Jewelry from someone's neck. . . . The finger of one of the dead had been cut off to remove a ring'.^{lxix}

Ben-Gurion, after being consulted by the Minister of Finance of Arab private property being taken from banks of Haifa at an estimated "1,500,000,000 pounds of deposits belonging to Arabs," permitted such expropriations, leading the Israeli historian Segev to note that "the government, too, took a hand in the division of the spoils."^{lx} This looting included also how Israeli officials expelled Palestinians from their homes and farms, even while many retained legal rights over such property:

The authority of the military governors was also utilized to expropriate lands. The military governor would issue an order to expel villagers from their homes, or forbid them entrance to their fields and thereby prevent them from cultivating them. Then the Minister of Agriculture would declare the lands to be uncultivated and use his authority to hand them over to others to cultivate. In this way Arab farmers lost their lands without actually losing their title to them.^{lxi}

Sometimes this eviction would include entire Palestinian cities like that of Tiberias in September of 1949 when Yigdal Yadin "recommended that the entire city be destroyed in order to prevent the Arab residents from returning";^{lxii} or in Jaffa, a major economic Palestinian port, where Ben-Gurion in that same year proclaimed "Jaffa will be a Jewish city" and permitted "whoever grabbed them first" to have official jurisdiction over the said property.^{lxiii}

Interestingly enough, however, that while many Arab Palestinians did leave their homes and were never able to return, some of them, to the disappointment of Israeli Zionists, remained in the outlying areas yet still within the new borders of Israel. These "internal refugees" were able to find ways to survive and build massive refugee settlements. These remaining Palestinians have one of the world's highest birth rates, leading many Israelis into expressing racist concerns over demographic ratios between Jews and Arab. Of special concern to Israeli nationalists, therefore, is the fear that the so-called "Jewish-character" of the state of Israel would be lost, a fear that is not unlike the way Nazis were concerned about the "Aryan" character of Germany.

The Palestinian-American anthropologist Rhoda Kanaaneh, in her book *Birthing the Nation*, demonstrates the deep anxieties many Israelis felt towards these demographical issues. From its very founding to today's Israel, leading officials have been trying to reduce the birth rates of Arabs while simultaneously increasing those of Jews. In most cases, they would expound freely racist concerns like that of Golda Meir who would sleep every night with the fear of knowing that more Arab babies will be born, and then "cried in relief when Russian Jews began arriving in Israel in the early 1970s: 'At last real Jews are coming to Israel again'."^{lxiv} David Ben-Gurion likewise in his visits to the Galilee in northern Israel would protest the fact of large numbers of Palestinian Arabs he encountered there and made the comment, "Am I traveling in Syria?" and then shortly thereafter ordered the creation of a Jewish settlement named Karmiel.^{lxv} A recent article in an Israeli paper states the very same concerns in even more clear language, with the title of the article giving-away the substance of the essay: "Battle in Bed Still Favors Arabs."^{lxvi} The so-called dove of Israel, Shimon Peres, participated in the same racialized demographic discourse when he recently eluded to the "Palestinian demographic danger" over the rising population numbers of Palestinians on the 1967 Green Line separating Jews from Arabs. He was concerned that this could possibly lead to a blurring boundary between Israel and the West Bank Palestinians. His fear was

slightly put at ease as “he hoped the arrival of 100,000 Jews in Israel would postpone this demographic ‘danger’ for ten more years, as ultimately, he stressed ‘demography will defeat geography’.”^{lxvii}

But given the fact that they were unable to completely depopulate the Arab population, Zionists were forced to deal with them with the second best option available to them, one which allowed Jews to manage the Palestinian natives while yet keeping the latter spatially and temporally distant. Indeed, the racialized brand of socialism that many Zionists carried with them to Palestine advocated for an interjection of modernity into the Orient so as to awaken the despotic Other from their pre-capitalist long sleep. This came in the form of modernization discourse so essential to their simplistic notion of socialism. Equipped with Marxist’s theory of history as an unfolding telos towards a progressive end, the Western Jew was seen as playing a necessary role in setting a backward region into a forward motion, helping to place the all too-bogged-down feudal-like Palestinian back on the track of progress so as to serve history’s purpose. As Sa’di has persuasively argued, “the Zionists’ self-perception as bearers of higher culture, and civilized values . . . [has] endowed [Zionists] with a moral right and even with an obligation to spread civilization among the natives.”^{lxviii}

Here, the European Jew represents Karl Marx’s British colonial regime breaking down the walls of China so that it too may be allowed to experience the unfolding of history as it is freed from the shackles of despotism. In this racialized form of socialism, Jews become likewise the current agents of history who have been called upon to deliver the poor, backward Arabs to rise up from their sad Oriental backwardness so as to be saved by their European advanced folks.

For these socialist Zionists, the native Palestinians are often characterized as thankful to have the settlers in Palestine saving them from their deep sleep of barbarism.^{lxix} Indeed, non-socialist Zionists like Theodor Herzl also used this civilizing discourse in which he would narrate the Palestinian as ever grateful to the civilizer. Indeed, in his futuristic novel that we discussed earlier, even though he stated his preference of European Jews over that of the Arab, the actual Arabs that his two characters meet in Palestine are portrayed in the following manner:

“Just look at that field! It was a swamp in my boyhood. The New Society bought up this tract rather cheaply, and turned it into the best soil in the country. It belongs to that tidy settlement up there in the hill. It is a Moslem village—you can tell from the mosque. These people are better off than at any time in the past. . . .”

“You’re queer fellows, you Moslems. Don’t you regard these Jews as intruders?”

“You speak strangely, Christian,” responded the friendly Reschid. “Would you call a man a robber who takes nothing from you, but brings you something instead? The Jews have enriched us. Why should we be angry with them? They dwell among us like brothers. Why should we not love them? I have never had a better friend among co-religionists than David Littwak here. He may come to me, by day or night, and ask what he pleases. I shall give it him. And I know that I, too, may count upon him as upon a brother.”^{lxx}

In another novel *The Sons of the First Rain* by E. Semoli, the theme is almost the exact same as that in Herzl’s, where in this case the character is a Palestinian teacher who wonders into a Jewish school and is not only utterly impressed by what he sees there but also by the great

knowledge that he could now bring back to his less developed and knowledgeable community:

In the name of God there are many things we have to learn from you, the Jews. This place was barren and deserted and you came and through your energy, you transformed it into paradise, vegetables, flowers, shade-giving tress. There are numerous such plots even larger than this in our village and they serve as lair to donkeys and camels without anyone growing anything on them. . . . I always say in my heart: God sent the Jews here to serve as an example for us. We shall observe them and do the same. The main thing is that we live in peace as good neighbors. Here you paid us a visit and also we came to see you at school. . . . We have benefited from your capital, your energy and your good example.^{lxxi}

The famous socialist Zionist Brenner likewise wrote in 1920, “It was for me to enlighten you, to let you taste human relations.”^{lxxii}

In other cases, Zionists would use civilizing discourse in the same way John Stuart Mill discussed how land and governance should be distributed to the most civilized and capable peoples, while those more primitive should be kept waiting until they have matured enough to make claims to such rights. In full agreement with these imperial philosophers, Zionists would utilize the idea of their Christian European predecessors to argue that land acquisition should be based on who is ready to make it productive and has the means to develop it, not who actually lives on it.^{lxxiii} Similarly, these Jewish nationalists converted the views and policies that the anti-Semites used against Jews in Europe who argued that only through agricultural labor could the Jews be saved from their corrupt trades that they have historically occupied. The logic of this type of argument permits Zionists like David Ben-Gurion and others to claim that due to the fact that Israel has the capability to make the “desert bloom,” than “there is no moral principle according to which Jews could be prevented from developing the country. Their ability to develop the country gives them the right over it.”^{lxxiv}

Nowhere was this civilizing mission made more clear than in 1939-1940 New York World’s Fair, where Zionists created the Palestinian Pavilion. Like the white planners of the 1893 Chicago World Fair, “American Zionists sought to use the Jewish Palestine Pavilion to show off the good works and the civilizing role taken on by Jews in Palestine.”^{lxxv} Besides narrating traditional Palestine as the land of the Jewish people, where one could find references limited only to Abraham, or “the return of Jews” from exile in Egypt and Babylonia, with no mention or references to the larger span of the Arab and Muslim period, the pavilion is set up so as to display the progress European Jews made to Palestine. In almost the exact format of Epcot’s Spaceship Earth, visitors “ascend a ‘staircase of rising immigration,’ which was inscribed with the names and dates of Jewish settlements” and then enter an exhibition hall with “animated dioramas depicting ‘the transformation of a backward and neglected land into a thriving modern country by the devoted labors of heroic Chalutzim [pioneers]’”:

In these dioramas you will see how the countryside had grown arid because of the dying up of the wells and springs, how sand dunes covered fields once fruitful, hills stood bare of timber, valleys were marshy with the unguided waters of streams which once had nourished grain and fruit-trees. A primitive population lived a semi-nomadic life in this land, which you could barely provide them with a meager sustenance. . . . Into this land came Jewish settlers, inspired with the hope of establishing there a new home for the oppressed.^{lxxvi}

In such narratives of modernization, visitors get to watch the pioneering spirit of Jewish settlers transform major Palestinian cities into modern metropolises, where these cities advance from “tiny villages” and “marshy waste” into “the great metropolis [they are] today.” The pavilion ends with the slogan: “For centuries this ancient land lay barren and neglected, ravaged by wars fought over its holy sites.”^{lxxvii} Brandeis, for whom a university would be named after, added to this discourse by arguing that the Palestinian pavilion demonstrates Zionism’s “mission in the wilderness” and how such a movement by the Jews would bring “enlightenment to the far reaches of the globe.”^{lxxviii}

TO MAKE PALESTINIANS DISAPPEAR BIBLICALLY

While demographic policies were a semi-effective way of making Palestinians disappear from the land, there were other options available for Zionists to pursue. The two that stand out the most are the production of a Christian-Judeo Biblical narrative while the other is a monopoly over an archeological representation of the Holy Land. In both cases the Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian historical record was marginalized if not silenced.

From its earliest days, the Zionist movement recognized that its successful creation of a Jewish state in a territory populated by others depended upon the sanction of current imperial powers that were colonizing the region. Such forefathers as Herzl, Weizmann, and Ben-Gurion, for example, regularly appealed to Great Britain and the United States. Since their political project was in search of an imperial sponsor for a new Jewish state, these Zionists recognized early on that an effective means to that end would be to gain the attention of Western powers by appealing to the latter’s Christian obsession with the Holy Land.

During the fledgling years of the Zionist movement, many European and American leaders had, for some time, already been showing enthusiasm for the creation of a Jewish homeland in the ancient Middle East. Indeed, as Donald Akenson argues, the appeal for a Jewish state up until the late nineteenth century, “was more widespread among Bible-reading Protestants—especially those of the British Isles—than among diaspora Jewry.”^{lxxix} By the twentieth century, the Holy Land had become a largely recognized element of popular European and American self-perception. While the typical imperial ambitions of cheap labor, new markets, and natural resources had played a part in the colonization of Palestine, the emergence of a national and religious identification with the region, particularly with Jerusalem, that many Western Christians felt, formed a unique factor that set it apart from other colonized territories. In this sense, Palestine had formed an unusual part of the colonial imagination, principally because it was not perceived as an ordinary colonial outpost of Western powers. As Edward Said explains, Palestine embodied “an almost mythological territory saturated with religious ideology and endowed with overwhelming cultural significance...weighed down with historical as well as political meanings for many generations, peoples, and traditions.”^{lxxx}

It is within this context that Zionists began, during the early years of the twentieth century, to explore the possibility of a coalition with Christian evangelicals, first in Great Britain and soon thereafter in America, in their efforts to establish a Jewish state.^{lxxxi} Christian Zionists—embodying a tradition older than its Jewish counterpart—thus became essential to the Zionist movement. Today, evangelical traditions of biblical prophecy still form one of the key supportive discourses regarding Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, specifically East Jerusalem and the West Bank.^{lxxxii} By seeing the Holy Land strictly through a Biblical

lens, Israel's non-Jewish population not only becomes textually missing from the land but is, more significantly, understood as the illegitimate occupiers of it.

This revision of Christian attitudes toward Palestine, coupled with the growing influence of Europe, particularly Protestant Britain, over the affairs of the Middle East, represents a significant paradigmatic shift that would in time make it possible for a small sector of European Jews in the nineteenth century to invent Jewish Zionism, while it provided fertile soil for a sympathetic attitude within Europe regarding the movement's proposal for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Without such a shift, any notion of a physical return to the Holy Land would have been very unlikely. As the Old Testament was adored by Protestants who had memorized prophetic writings describing struggles and triumphs in Palestine, Zionists would find in them a useful ally in their goals of building and establishing a Jewish state.

This shift in Christian discourse was a tremendously useful tool for Zionists to appropriate toward their goals of building and establishing a Jewish state. Long before the arrival of Theodor Herzl and other prominent Jewish nationalists, as Regina Sharif has so persuasively argued, there had already existed a significant non-Jewish Zionist movement within Europe.^{lxxxiii} Had such a historical context not been available in the nineteenth century, Jewish nationalism and its vision of the Holy Land would surely have taken a very different form. The fact that a modern Zionist template had been developed and nourished by Bible-reading Protestants is highly significant, for when the time was ripe for the Jewish proposal of a Jewish state, amid a fully deflated Ottoman Empire in the grips of Europe, the idea of Israel had already seemed "obvious." The memory of a Land called Holy and the intrigue it inspired in the European imagination played a major role in the development of Jewish Zionism. As Walter Eytan announced in 1958, "the very name 'Israel' is so much part of the Christian heritage" that "when the Jewish State was established and called Israel, it did not have to explain itself."^{lxxxiv} In order to understand the development of Zionism, therefore, it is pertinent to locate its discursive property as emanating from and latching onto the religious changes taking place within imperial Europe.

The founding fathers of the Zionist movement were aware of the potential appeal their ideas would hold for Christians and many often consciously appropriated European Protestant notions as they developed a mythology of the land of Israel. In this manner, they employed a script with which the British could sympathize and identify. As Jewish settlements and Zionist ideas flourished within the context of British colonial maneuvers in the Holy Land, the success of the Zionist movement would come to depend greatly upon its alliance with Christian Zionists, as well as upon British commitment regarding the Jewish "return" to Palestine.

By 1900, it had already been made evident in a speech Herzl delivered in London that a clear recognition of the alliance between Jewish and Christian Zionists was fully in play. During the fourth Zionist Congress, he addressed the assembly acknowledging with full confidence the role of Great Britain: "From this place the Zionist movement will take a higher and higher flight....England the great, England the free, England with her eyes fixed on the seven seas, will understand us."^{lxxxv} Herzl had been made well aware of Christian Zionist wishes a decade earlier when an influential American evangelist named William E. Blackstone learned upon his visit to Palestine in 1889 that Herzl had been considering Uganda and Argentina as possible sites for the Jewish homeland. Immediately, he sent Herzl a Bible, "marking every passage which referred to Palestine, with instructions that it alone was to be the site of the Jewish State."^{lxxxvi}

As Barbara Rossing contends, the consequence of Evangelical practice is that “Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem—many who have been refugees with their families since 1948—feel the crushing weight of this triumphalistic understanding of biblical prophecies.”^{lxxxvii} According to Father Michael Prior, this form of Christian Zionism is “insensitive to the human rights of the Palestinians, demonizes Islam, and assists in the immigration of Jews to Israel.”^{lxxxviii}

Evangelical Zionists adopt one of the earliest tenets of Zionism, maintaining that the indigenous Arab population has no rightful claim of nationhood and ought to be transferred to Jordan, but they add the variant that the Bible promises Israel’s right to all of East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories.^{lxxxix}

In this biblical narrative, the entire history and existence of a people is suppressed so as to create a political project that favors one imagined national community at the expense of another. Michael Prior echoes this sentiment in his examination of Zionism: “With the controlling voice exercised by them the wider history of the region was effectively silenced.”^{xc} Just as Israeli archeology marginalizes other histories for the sake of bringing forth a Jewish nationalist narrative, Evangelical and Jewish Zionists render Palestinians invisible in order to invoke their Christian Endtimes narrative, in which Muslims do not make the stage.

At the center of this idea, Zionist Israel and the West were bound together and informed by a shared vision for the Holy Land while the Arab Palestinian inhabitants were relegated to be its illegitimate inheritors. In a short period of time, this rationality made possible Jewish Settlements while the Arab Palestinians were in turn resettled in their “natural” Arab habitat in that other Oriental land that lay outside of Zion. Hence, the Palestinians remained eastern and Oriental while the new Jewish settlers and the Land Called Holy were appropriated as an integral part of the West. The Palestinians were relegated to belonging to an Oriental ocean that lay outside the frontiers of the Holy Land. If any actually lived in Palestine they were there as a result of an illegitimate invasion of days past. It was the genius rethinking of Jewish history that the Zionists were able to suit the significance of this Christian reading of Arab Palestine to their own articulation of *Eretz Israel* as the natural Homeland for the Jews. It was also this very same idea that would claim the Jew and his Land as laying outside of the Orient, belonging to a people who were modern, European, and civilized. As Raz-Krakotzkin explains,

“The Land” had no history outside its place in the Jewish-Christian theological myth, and was imagined as the land of the Bible in accordance with conventional Orientalist imagery. The land itself was considered to be in exile, until its return to its original “husbands,” the Jewish people who came to “redeem” it/her. Palestine was imagined solely as the source of the Jewish-Christian civilization, through the denial of its Arab-Islamic history.^{xcii}

Indeed, the imagery and symbolism of the Holy Land was, and remains, an essential part of the Western conception of the self, where the Scriptures (both the New and the Torah), Jesus’ life, his crucifixion and resurrection, as well as the lives of the twelve apostles and the tremendous outpouring of pilgrimage literature and other artistic visual representations of the Land called Holy, all provided “the West” with a vibrant and living historical memory of the Holy Land. The Land Called Holy, the need and desire to identify with it, the feeling and belief that it is part of “our” past, solely belonging to “us,” has come to be viewed as an essential property of the “West.”

The impact of this historical memory has provided the source by which Palestine would come to be viewed not as the property of the “Oriental Other” but as an internal property of Europe itself, with Jews as the rightful Biblical keepers of it, a perspective Zionism was quick to make its own. The symbolism of the Holy Land’s sacredness in Scriptures and popular memory provided the Zionist movement with a powerful and convenient discourse in its ambitions to displace Palestinian claims over the land.

TO MAKE PALESTINIANS DISAPPEAR ARCHEOLOGICALLY

As for archeology, recent scholars critical of Israeli archeology have argued that a large number of past digs contributed to Israeli nationalist policy designed to silence the Palestinian experience, while simultaneously promoting a Jewish historical narrative. As Massad has persuasively argued, “the Israelis, who have a monopoly on [archeological digs], are in a constant search for archeological ‘proofs’ of pre-diasporic Hebrew ‘settlement’ in all parts of historic Palestine to further authenticate European Jewish claims to Palestinian/Israeli space and time.”^{xcii} As Nadia Abu El-Haj has argued in her book, *Facts on the Ground: Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society* (2002), one example of how this has been accomplished was in the immediate development of archeological excavations following the capture of Jerusalem’s Old City in 1967 with the attempt to promote the legitimacy of a Jewish nation’s “return” to its original homeland. These digs emphasized, in a nationally skewed manner, not the city’s many centuries of Muslim history, but rather the era of the Israelite Temples that represented an ancient Jewish national claim. In this manner, Israel pursued a narrative suggesting its revival of an original community that has always been linked with the land of Palestine. The significance of this strategy to accentuate a biblical past at the expense of the more recent, and much longer, Islamic period should not be underestimated, for as the historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues in his *Silencing the Past*, the production of a historical narrative between competing groups is always biased toward the groups that have greater access to the means of such production. Although the consequences of this silencing and nationalizing power may not be as visible as military escapades, it is nonetheless equally effective as forming yet another arsenal the state uses to ethnically purify national memory. This is especially still true today as the overwhelming majority of “research” digs are those perceived to be of national significance to the state of Israel, despite the fact that such efforts only represent a window to one chapter of the great Palestine saga.

In this sense we can employ the analogy of the bulldozer as a machine that devours not only Palestinian homes but also Palestinian history. As Nadia Abu El-Haj has recently argued, bulldozers are regularly used in Israel to both remove Palestinians in a physical sense from traditional Palestine as well as to dig through many layers of traditional Palestine, leaving the latter’s historical artifacts poorly recovered if not completely destroyed. In the latter case, this has the devastating effect to cast aside, or perhaps possibly destroying, significant Islamic archeological treasures in favor of the Iron Age, as well-funded archeologists search particularly for remnants of the First and Second Temples that are at once recognized as important “national” artifacts.^{xciii} Such archeological narrations create a past in which Palestine is associated to belong not to the natives who inhabit it, but to a “Judeo-Christian” civilization. Hence, it produces a narration in which thirteen centuries of Arab Muslim and Arab Christian history in Palestine is perpetually marginalized. “In this context,” Raz-Krakotzkin suggests, “the East—the concrete Arab existence on the land—was deemed inconsequential, and subsequently rejected to the point of obliteration. This mythical

concept of the land continues to inform Israeli culture today, and the history of Palestine since the Second Temple is ignored in school curricula, both ‘secular’ and ‘religious’.”^{xci} As I visited over the years Israel’s museums in Jerusalem and elsewhere, I am always stunned to discover how small were its showcases of the Islamic period in comparison to its abundant and extensive Jewish showcases even though the former ruled over historical Palestine many centuries longer than their Christian and Jewish counterparts *combined*. Yet one would not know this looking at the present archeological record, or all of the PBS documentaries on the historical Holy Land, where usually only a few minutes are dedicated to Islamic history in a sixty-minute documentary, showing only the Al-Aqsa mosque while extensively discussing many of the Jewish and Christian sites outside of the basic and central sights of the Wailing Wall and the Holy Sepulcher.

While archeologists continue to gain funding, prestige, and media coverage as they focus on eras of “national ascendance” and “glory” in the ancient or medieval pasts, the historical memory of Islamic and Palestinian history will continue to be marginalized and silenced unless postnationalist archeologists are permitted more privileges to dig the land so as to uncover its more encompassing and symbiotic nature. Towards that end we need to focus some of our energy and funding towards those archeologists who can offer us a more nuanced and balanced understanding of traditional Palestine than those found in the mainstream of American and Israeli archeology. These archeological representations “left no room for the Arabs themselves, their contemporary reality, and their rights. By appropriating the ‘nativeness’ of the Arabs, the Zionists assumed the role of natives and rendered the indigenous population obsolete. Evidently, the real [native] Arabs . . . from the outset were considered alien.”^{xci}

IV

Zionism and the De-Arabizing of the Arab Jew

HOW WE FORGOT THE ARAB IN THE JEW

Yet what is most interesting about the discursive nature of Zionist discourse is the manner by which they set out to de-Orientalize a large portion of Jews from Arab and the non-Western lands. As these Zionists traveled East to Palestine and encountered the Jews of the East, they applied the standard insults anti-Semites used against them in Europe and elsewhere towards Eastern Jewry. Jews who have inhabited for several centuries the Near East (the Mediterranean, the Fertile Crescent, Africa, the Islamic Empires, the Levant, Spain and elsewhere) were discursively racialized as belonging to the lost and antiquated tribes of Israel, frozen in time and who are in need of rescue by the more advanced Jews of the north. In this way, the objective was to detox the Oriental Jew from what Zionists perceived to be their despotic and cultural contamination of the Arab and Islamic world, a cleansing that would require the latter to be removed from their historical roots, with their Arabness erased, all while in the process of regenerating them into the new and Occidentalized Jew. If the Christian and Muslim Palestinians were to be historically, archeologically, and demographically silenced, these Jews were seen as possible candidates to Israeli citizenship. But this came at a cost. In order to be accepted by Euro-Jews, who saw themselves as representatives of a superior Western culture, they required that Arab and other non-Western Jews “abandon their traditions, deny their past, and erase their memories.”^{xci}

The problem that confronted Arab Jews was the fact that Zionists and Arab nationalists created a dichotomy of Jew and Arab, leaving the Mizrahim (as Arab Jews were later called in Israel) with little option to create an identity outside of this taxonomy. Since the new Israeli state defined itself as both the representative of world Jewry and as radically distinct from the Arabs surrounding it, the terms of citizenship entailed the erasure of any hyphens that linked Jews to the Arab-Islamic world. As Ella Shohat eloquently suggests,

Fearing engulfment by the East, the Euro-Israeli establishment attempted to repress the “Middle Easternness” of Mizrahim as part of an effort to Westernize the Israeli nation and to mark clear borders of identity between Jews as Westerners and Arabs as Easterners. Arab Jews were urged to see Judaism and Zionism as synonyms, and Jewishness and Arabness as antonyms. Thus Arab Jews were prodded to choose between anti-Zionist Arabness and a pro-Zionist Jewishness.^{xcvii}

After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and with the mass migration of Arab Jews into the new state, what were historically interlinked identities, Jew and Arab became two distinct and separate categories of people, a rupture so complete that today, within a short period stretching only a couple generations, many people are surprised to learn that many Jews were once Arab themselves.^{xcviii}

Hence, the Sephardic and the “Oriental” Jew in the process is erased by these new developments, and their history is separated, extracted, and removed from its Mediterranean, Levantine, and North African context.^{xcix} While Palestinians were relegated as aliens to the Jewish State, “Arab Jews, trapped in a no-exit situation, have been forbidden to nourish memories of having belonged to the peoples across the River Jordan, across the mountains of Lebanon, and across the Sinai desert and Suez Canal. The persuasive notion of ‘one people’ reunited in their ancient homeland actively deauthorizes any affectionate memory of life before the State of Israel.”^c

The fact that Israel is founded on the basis of its rejection of the Orient, it not only attempted to de-Arabize native Christian and Muslim Palestinians, but also to reject any cultural traditions tainted by that part of the world, including those that came with the Mizrahim.^{ci} In order to appreciate the gravity of such change, it is important to emphasize that before the coming of Israel, with few exceptions, the inhabitants of traditional Palestine, especially its Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities, not only intermingled in the streets, but lived, played, and prayed in a neighborly fashion far more closely than can be imagined today; and in no place was this more evident than in Jerusalem, where, as S.D. Goiten among others note, homes and other residential compounds were often shared to the extent that Muslims and Jews occupied different rooms under the same roof.^{cii}

Current formations of identity permit such familiarities precious little room. Even contemporary temples of knowledge house library stacks that are shelved in different sections, according to Jewish or Arab affiliation, “studied by different scholars, and are taught by different departments even though in some cases they come from the same place and time.”^{ciii} Indeed, in complete contradiction to modern notions of progress that champion tolerance, exchange, and inclusive societies, the nearer to the present the lens is focused, the sharper the view of exclusivity becomes. As if obsessed with a newfound skill, nations are more efficient than ever at policing their borders, always choosing to reinforce them at any sign of tension or breach. In Israel, this has translated into an ever-maturing image of Jews and Arabs as of two chemical compounds that may combust if mixed together. This insistence upon separateness that has engulfed Jew and Arab alike has served

to implicitly suggest a sense of ideological, social, and political volatility, leaving little space for the production of a symbiotic culture.^{civ} This rupture is so deep that when major Jewish intellectuals like Maimonides, Yehuda HaLevi, and Ibn Gabriol are discussed, they are decontextualized from their Arab environment and made to stand as representatives of one unitary Jewish history, under the sign of a dominant Euro-Israeli stamp.^{cv} The culture that Maimonides and other Arab Jewish intellectuals possessed was silenced and made invisible so as to heighten and expand the Occidentalized version of the Jewish nation. As such, “Israel has taken upon itself to ‘cleanse’ the Sephardim of their Arabness and redeem them from their ‘primal sin’ of belonging to the Orient.”^{cvi} This is indeed how we forgot the Arab in the Jew.

THE PREFERENCE FOR EUROPEAN JEWS

Indeed, when Jewish settlers from Europe came into direct contact with the Jews living in the East, they responded very similarly to the way Christian European anti-Semites looked suspiciously upon their Jews as Orientals who, due to their race, can’t help but act and behave in ways opposite of the time and space of the modern society they reside in. They were repulsed and rejected them outright, as was the case with the Zionist Israel Auerbach, who complains that the Asian Jew

is the pure Oriental. Contended, because lacking in aspirations; peaceful, because indolent; uncomplaining, because submissive; dying with reverence before money, splendour, dignity, titles, because of centuries of despotism; cautious, indeed mistrustful and devious, because used to being surrounded by spies; mainly poor and uneducated, because lacking social organization; unpolitical, unenterprising, unfree, because politics, courage and freedom were forbidden by the lords of the Orient.^{cvi}

These ideas were widespread within the Zionist movement, as in the case of Vladimir Jabotinsky, who loudly proclaimed that “We must put an end to any trace of the Oriental spirit in the [native] Jews of Palestine” and in an article goes on to explain that he opposed the idea of mixed-marriages between European and Arab Jews as well as integration of the latter into the new state on the premise that “he did not know whether this would result in ‘a brilliant people or a dull race’.”^{cvi} Ben-Gurion made similar pronouncements when he stated that “The Jews of Europe were ‘the leading candidates for citizenship in the State of Israel’” and was only willing to bring a race of such low quality as that of Arab Jews under the most pressing needs, and compared the latter “with the Africans who were brought in as slaves to America.”^{cix}

Indeed, the leadership of the Zionist movement targeted Jews of the Arab world for immigration only when the reservoir of the preferred Euro-Jews were not enough to fill quotas of Jewish numbers in relation to Palestinians. They were regarded as necessary to ensure a Jewish majority. Also, in fear that native Palestinians would fill in jobs required to run the new Israeli economy, they sought out Jews in the surrounding Arab countries to make sure that they retain the complete segregation of Palestinians. In this sense, Jews “were regarded as the human reservoir that would ensure a Jewish majority in Palestine. Their mass migration was rationalized in almost purely demographic terms.”^{cx} To make such a supply available to Israel, Zionists collaborated with a few Arab regimes, like that of Iraq’s Nuri al-Sa’id, so as “to place a wedge between the Jewish and Muslim communities, for example, by placing bombs in synagogues to generate panic on the part of Jews.”^{cx} They also supported

such Arab regimes in “legislation that revoked the citizenship of Jews, in order to force them to emigrate.”^{cxii}

It was with this new and relatively large immigration of Arab Jews that many Euro-Israelis became concerned about the civilizational orientation of Israel, and were especially concerned about whether or not Israel would become European or victim of the East and melt into the Orient. As the following excerpt demonstrates, terms like “Levantization” became the words through which this fear was expressed:

The ascendance of this Levantine type will finally signal the end of great social dream; the wish to create ‘good society’ will sink under the sheer weight of Middle-Eastern numbers. And indeed . . . the cynicism and signs of moral decay already present in Israeli life attest to the growing influence of this Levantine spirit.^{cxiii}

Jews of the Arab world, including those who were of upper class, upon their arrival in Israel were forced into extremely poor settlements, while Jews from Europe were provided with the best housing and employment available at the time. Also, unlike Euro-Jews, these Arab Jews “were sprayed with DDT (Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane) to ‘disinfect’ them and ‘delouse’ them.”^{cxiv}

The hope of the Zionists lay in the anti-Semitic notion that Arab Jews, if giving productive labor, could be salvageable and remade in the image of their more civilized Jewish brothers and sisters. Indeed, Zionist intellectuals like Brenner, Mapu, Borochoy, and Katznelson made arguments similar to the European Christian intellectuals who advocated for Jewish integration like Dohm’s that we discussed earlier, claiming that it is indeed possible to pull such Jews out of the dustbins of prehistory if they were given a chance in productive labor, especially agricultural labor. These Ashkenazi Jews likewise “advanced *avoda ivrit* as a necessary precondition for Jewish recuperation.”^{cxv} The newspaper, *HaTzvi*, expresses this sentiment well:

This is the simple, natural worker capable of doing any kind of work, without shame, without philosophy, and also without poetry. And Mr. Marx is of course absent both from his pocket and from his mind. It is not my contention that the Yemenite element should remain in its present state, that is, in his barbarian, wild present state. . . . [T]he Yemenite of today still exists at the same backward level as the Fellahins. . . . [T]hey can take the place of the Arabs.^{cxvi}

Jewish labor recruiters were sent to Arab countries, like that of Yemen, as early as 1909 from Palestine to find Arab Jewish workers to hire in the new Jewish-only agricultural settlements. The objective here was to bring an end to Arab Palestinian labor, who up until then provided cheap wage workers. Jews from the Arab world, since they were understood by European Jewish settlers as backwards and not in need of much outside of what is necessary to survive, thus concluded that they were “to be the ideal solution to satisfy both nationalist and capitalist interests as ‘they were Jewish workers who were to be paid Arab wages’.”^{cxvii}

UPLIFTING ARAB JEWS

But if the Arab Jew was a necessary alternative to the Palestinian Arab, then the Oriental culture that they both shared must be undone, with the Jews of the Orient uplifted from their backward state. For many Israelis, these Arab Jewish immigrants, in order to be

brought into modernity, must be acculturated into the new time-space of Israel, which acted as a sort of time machine that projected the Jew out of antiquity and into the new. In this new and modern society, these Arab Jews would have the opportunity to learn the benefits of using modern sanitation and toilet paper, as one newspaper claims.^{cxviii} As a commentary by Arye Gelbum in *Haaretz* explains,

'This is a race unlike any we have seen before. They say there are differences between the people from Tripolitania, Morocco, Tunisia and Algiera, but I can't say I have learned what those differences are, if they do, in fact, exist. They say, for example, that the Triplitanians and Tunisians are 'better' than the Moroccans and Algerians, but it's the same problem with them all. . . . Have we given sufficient thought to the question of what will happen to this state if this should be its population?—And then, in addition, [other] Oriental Jews will eventually join them, too! What will happen to the State of Israel and its standards with this type of population? Obviously all these Jews are entitled to come here no less than others, and they should be brought over and absorbed, but if it is carried out without consideration for our limited capacities and if it is not done gradually, they will 'absorb' us rather than we them. . . . To raise their general standards from their communal depths would take generations.^{cxix}

Indeed, as far as Zionists saw it, the task of the new state is to Occidentalize all Jews, but especially the Jews of the Orient, who needed special care to assure that they are properly civilized and "raised" to the level of their European patriots. The task became especially urgent given the fact that these Oriental Jews came in large numbers and may cause the racial and cultural stock of Israel to devolve "down" to the level of the Arabs surrounding them. This is well expressed in David Ben-Gurion's fear that

'Those [Jews] from Morocco had no education. Their customs are those of Arabs . . . The Moroccan Jew took a lot from the Moroccan Arabs. The culture of Morocco I would not like to have here. And I don't see what contribution present [Jewish] Persians have to make . . . We do not want Israelis to become Arabs. We are in duty bound to fight against the spirit of the Levant, which corrupts individuals and societies, and preserve the authentic Jewish values as they crystallized in the [European] Diaspora.^{cxx}

Similarly Abba Eban made it known that the resources of the state should be used so as "to infuse (the Sephardim) with an Occidental spirit, rather than allow them to drag us into an unnatural Orientalism,'" otherwise there "is the danger lest the predominance of immigrants of Oriental origin force Israel to equalize its cultural level with that of the neighboring world.'" Golda Meir also feared that the presence of these Jews may cause the new Jewish society, rather than advancing forward, back into the time of the Middle Ages.^{cxxi} Sometimes non-temporal descriptions were used, as in the case of H. Tsvieli, an emissary for the Jewish Agency in Libya, who "described the Jews he met there as if he were trading in horses: 'They are handsome as far as their physique and outward appearance are concerned, but I found it very difficult to tell them apart from the good quality Arab type'."^{cxix} In all cases, Jews from Arab countries should be "handled like dangerous, potentially polluting substances" where "maintaining control was key."^{cxiii}

But the dilemma in this strategy is that the state, being a citizen of all Jews, needed a way to place responsibility on the backward nature of these Jews without the blame falling on their Jewishness. Since this was a Jewish state, their inability to evolve to a higher stage could not

be seen as caused by the same characteristics that they shared with Euro-Israelis, for that would make them in agreement with those anti-Semites who believed that the cause of the degenerated state of the Jews lie in their religion or race, not their environment, an admittance that would be too painful for a society that identifies itself as Jewish. The simplest way out of this dilemma was thus to appropriate the Orientalist conception that the reasons for their “fallen” state is due to the despotic nature of the Arab-Islamic world that they have been trapped in, and that with being exposed to a civilized society like Israel would speed up the process in which they could regain time and evolve and integrate into an Occidental-like people. In the provocative words of Gabriel Piterberg,

Orientalism is then used again, this time to extricate the Oriental Jews from their cultural context, so that the blame for the fact that they are “intellectually frozen, primitive and degenerated, superstitious, lazy, poor and filthy, physically unfit and unhealthy, uneducated and uncivilized, and humiliated and inferior” would not be pinned on their Jewish essence, but on their host societies, that is, the essentialized Orientalist notion of “Islam” . . . It makes it possible to represent the Islamic context as “responsible” for the alleged predicament of the Oriental Jews. The implication that in a different—essentially national—environment the Oriental Jews can be introduced to Western modernity is rather obvious.^{cxxiv}

Notice how this racialized discourse, as Ella Shohat argues, places European Jewry as the Sephardic Jews’ saviors “from the harsh rule of their Arab ‘captors,’” who graciously have taken “them out of ‘primitive conditions’ of poverty and superstition and ushered them gently into a modern Western society characterized by tolerance, democracy, and ‘humane values,’ values with which they were but vaguely and erratically familiar due to the ‘Levantine environments’ from which they came.”^{cxxv} A good example of this can be found in one of the most widely used history textbook in Israel:

While European Jewry was amidst a process of turbulent revolution and across the Ocean a new Jewish centre, very powerful and important, was gradually emerging, there were in the underdeveloped Islamic countries of Asia and Africa—previously fortresses of Jewish culture—Jewish collectives whose ways of life were frozen and fell into spiritual slumber . . . In the margins of the annals of the Jewish people . . . it was as if they were undergoing a historical slumber.^{cxxvi}

In other similar venues, the blame is placed on a “shortage of textbooks in Yemen” while at other times it is due to the fact that some of the Jews of the Arab world were forced to dwell in caves,^{cxxvii} living a life so primitive that such Jews, when transported from Yemen and other Arab countries by airplanes, were described by European Jews through the lens of Ali Baba and *A Thousand and One Nights*, as on a “magic carpet” journey to the promised land.^{cxxviii}

Hence, it was their “Arab environment,” not their Jewishness that kept them from evolving a civilized way. Karl Frankenstein, for instance, clarified this even further by arguing that there “retardation” and lack of development originated from their Oriental and Arab environment and not from their race or religion. He even went further to claim that while the “primitive mentality” of these Arab Jews can be compared with “the primitive expression of children, the retarded and the mentally disturbed,” their children, nonetheless, “could be rescued were they to be physically extracted from their traditional environs.”^{cxxix}

The desire to Occidentalize the Jew, as we discussed here, is thus dialogically related to the Anti-Semitic Gaze of Christian Europe. In the case of Israel the insult led to a massive campaign of ethnic and religious repression, where the Palestinian and Sephardic Jew were asked to bear the worst effects of the anti-Semitic gaze. Ashkenazi Jews turned their pain on to the weak so as to be permitted to cross the bridge of time and enter the gates of those defined as on top of the world.

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- i Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, eds. (2005), *Orientalism and the Jews*, Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, p. xxxvi.
 - ii *ibid*, p. 115.
 - iii Citation from *ibid*, p. 115.
 - iv Citation from *ibid*, p. 115.
 - v The citations of Herder, Schopenhauer, Sombart, and Rathenau are all taking from Ritchie Robertson (1999), *The "Jewish Question" in German Literature, 1749-1939*, p. 429.
 - vi Citation from *ibid*, p. 437.
 - vii Citation from *ibid*, p. 430.
 - viii cited in Aziza Khazzoom (2003: 491), "The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 68, August: 481-510.
 - ix Noah Isenberg (2005: 104), "To Pray Like A Dervish: Orientalist Discourse in Arnold Zweig's *The Face of East European Jewry*," in Kalmar, Ivan Davidson and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews*, Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, pp. 94-108.
 - x Jonathan Hess (2002: 2), *Germans, Jews and the Claims of Modernity*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press..
 - xi Grattenauer cited in Paul Mendes-Flohr (1991: 81), *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
 - xii Isenberg (2005: 100).
 - xiii Jonathan Hess (2002: 2).
 - xiv Nissim Rejwan (1999: 95), *Israeli's Place in the Middle East: A Pluralist Perspective*, Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida.
 - xv Khazzoom (2003: 489).
 - xvi Jonathan Hess (2002: 4).
 - xvii Khazzoom (2003: 491).
 - xviii Jonathan Hess (2002: 67).
 - xix *Ibid* (2002: 52).
 - xx Fries cited in Pasto (1998: 453-54), "Islam's 'Strange Secret Sharer': Orientalism, Judaism, and the Jewish Question," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.40, No.3 (July), pp.437-474.
 - xxi Last two citations are from Manor (2005:155), "Orientalism and Jewish National Art: The Case of Bezalel," in Kalmar, Ivan Davidson and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews*, Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, pp.142-161.
 - xxii Dalia Manor (2005: 157).
 - xxiii Ammon Raz-Krakovitzkin (2005:172), "The Zionist Return to the West and the Mizrahi Jewish Perspective," in Kalmar, Ivan Davidson and Derek J. Penslar, eds. (2005), *Orientalism and the Jews*, Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, pp. 163-181.
 - xxiv Isenberg (2005: 100).
 - xxv Zweig cited in *ibid* (2005: 98-99, emphasis added).
 - xxvi Rathenau cited in Mendes-Flohr (1991: 82).
 - xxvii Kalmar and Penslar (2005: xxxvi).
 - xxviii Jacques Kornberg (1993: 160), *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
 - xxix Daniel Boyarin (1997: 280-82), *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
 - xxx Theodore Herzl, (1988 [1896]), *The Jewish State*. New Jersey: Dover Publisher.

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- xxxⁱ Boyarin (1997: 287).
- xxxⁱⁱ Herzl cited in Boyarin (1997: 283-84).
- xxxⁱⁱⁱ Herzl cited in Kornberg (1993: 178).
- xxx^{iv} Kornberg (1993: 178).
- xxx^v Herzl cited in Boyarin (1997: 298).
- xxx^{vi} *ibid* (1993: 179).
- xxx^{vii} Boyarin (1997: 280).
- xxx^{viii} Noel Ignatiev (1995: 2), *How the Irish Became White*, Routledge: New York.
- xxx^{ix} This idea comes from David Roediger (1991): “White labour does not just receive and resist racist ideas but embraces, adopts and, at times, murderously acts upon those ideas. The problem is not just that the white working class is at critical junctures manipulated into racism, but that it comes to think of itself and its interests as white” (p. 12).
- xl For a contemporary view of what I call Occidentalization, see Thomas Cahill’s book (1988) in which he continually refers to the Jews as the inventors of Western Civilization: “By ‘we’ I mean the usual ‘we’ of the late-twentieth-century.” He directly links “we” with “our” Western civilization on numerous occasions, as, for example, here:
- The people of the Western World, whose peculiar but vital mentality has come to infect every culture on earth, so that, in a startlingly precise sense, all humanity is now willy-nilly caught up in this “we. ‘ For better or worse, the role of the West in humanity’s history is singular. Because of this, the role of the Jews, the inventors of Western culture, is also singular. Thomas Cahill (1998: 3). *The Gift of the Jews: How a Tribe of Desert Nomads Changed the Way Everyone Feels*, New York: Anchor Books.
- xli Frank Kaplan (2005: 127), “Between East and West: Zionist Revisionism as a Mediterranean Ideology,” in Kalmar, Ivan Davidson and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews*, Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 125-141.
- xlii *ibid* (2005:127).
- xliii cited in Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 170).
- xliv cited in Khazzoom (2003: 501).
- xl^v Joseph Massad (2006: 26), *The Persistence of the Palestinian Question: Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians*, London and New York: Routledge.
- xl^{vi} G.H. Jansen (1971: 219), *Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism*, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. Indeed, David Ben Gurion wrote an article for the French paper *Le Monde* in 1958 entitled, “Israel, Etat Occidental.”
- xl^{vii} (Boyarin 1997: 303).
- xl^{viii} (Khazzoom 2003: 489).
- xl^{ix} James Gelvin (2005: 69): *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; see also Gershon Shafir (1996): *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- l Theodor Herzl, in Raphael Patai (ed.), *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, New York: Herzl Press (1960: 87-88), cited in Michael Prior, *The Bible and Colonialism: A Moral Critique*, Sheffield, Eng.: Sheffield Academic Press (1997: 113).
- li Ben-Gurion cited in Tom Segev (1998: 28), *1949: The First Israelis*, New York: Owl Books.
- lii Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 169-70).
- liiⁱⁱⁱ *ibid* (2005:166).
- liv Jabotinsky cited in Massad (2006: 58).
- lv *ibid* (2006: 36); see also Segev (1996, chapters 2 to 4).
- lvi Shahak cited in Massad (2006: 39).
- lvⁱⁱ *Ibid* (2006: 39).
- lvⁱⁱⁱ cited in Segev (1998: 69).
- lix *ibid* (1998: 72).

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- lx *ibid* (1998: 73).
- lxi *ibid* (1998: 81).
- lxii *ibid* (1998: 85).
- lxiii *ibid* (1998: 75).
- lxiv Rhoda Kanaaneh (2002: 44), *Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press; Nira Yuval-Davis (1987: 70), *Gender and Nation*, London: Sage Publications.
- lxv Kanaaneh (2002: 52).
- lxvi *ibid* (2002: 38).
- lxvii Massad (2006: 148).
- lxviii Ahmad Sa'di (1997: 28), "Modernization as an Explanatory Discourse of Zionist-Palestinian Relations," in *The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (May), pp. 25-48.
- lxix Raz-Krakotzkin (2005:170).
- lxx Herzl (1960, 1997: 124).
- lxxi novel cited in Sa'di (1997: 31).
- lxxii cited in *ibid* (1997: 28).
- lxxiii Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 166).
- lxxiv Sa'di (1997: 29).
- lxxv Gelvin (2005: 147).
- lxxvi cited in *ibid* (2005: 149).
- lxxvii *ibid* (2005: 145-50).
- lxxviii *ibid* (2005: 149-150).
- lxxix Donald Harman Akenson (1992: 152), *God's People: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- lxxx Edward Said, "Introduction," in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (1989: 1), "A Profile of the Palestinian People," in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, *Blaming the Victim: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, London: Verso Press..
- lxxxi Michael Prior (1999: 140), *Zionism and the State of Israel*, London and New York: Routledge.
- lxxxii Barbara R. Rossing (2004: 49), *The Rapture Exposed: The Message of Hope in the Book of Revelation*, New York: Basic Books.
- lxxxiii Regina Sharif (1983), *Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots in Western History*, London: Zed Press.
- lxxxiv Walter Eytan (1958: 181), *The First Ten Years, A Diplomatic History of Israel*, New York: Simon and Schuster.
- lxxxv Sharif (1983: 74).
- lxxxvi See Don Wagner, "Beyond Armageddon," in *The Link*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1992: 1-13); Prior (1999: 140).
- lxxxvii Rossing (2004: 51).
- lxxxviii Prior (1999: 136).
- lxxxix Rossing (2004: 65).
- xc Prior (1999: 138).
- xci Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 168).
- xcii Massad (2006: 39).
- xciii Nadia Abu El-Haj (2001), *Facts On the Ground: Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- xciv Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 169).
- xcv *ibid* (2005: 169).
- xcvi *ibid* (2005: 171).

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- xcvii Ella Shohat (1999: 8), "The Invention of the Mizrahim," in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 29, No 1 (Autumn), pp. 5-20.
- xcviii Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 171).
- xcix This is a topic to which some recent writers are beginning to engage. See especially Rejwan (1998) and Ammiel Alcalay (1993), *After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- c Shohat (1999: 7)
- ci Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 173).
- cii S.D. Goiten's comment is found in *ibid* (2004: 74); Mark Cohen (1994: 126), *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- ciii Maria Rosa Menocal (2004: 21), *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- civ Ammiel Alcalay (1993:8), *After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- cv Shohat (1997: 45).
- cvi *ibid* (1997: 44).
- cvii Citation from Ritchie Robertson (1999: 489).
- cviii Massad (2006: 58).
- cix Segev (1998: 157).
- cx Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 172).
- cxii Shohat (1999: 12); Abbas Shibliak (1986), *The Lure of Zion* ; G.N. Giladi (1990), *Discord in Zion: Conflict Between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews in Israel*. London: Scorpion.
- cxiii Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 172).
- cxiiii Sa'di (1997: 34).
- cxv Massad (2006: 60).
- cxvi Shohat (1997: 49).
- cxvii *ibid* (1997: 50).
- cxviii Manor (2005: 158-60).
- cxviiii Segev (1998: 159).
- cxix *ibid* (1998: 159-61).
- cxx Ben-Gurion cited in Massad (2006: 61).
- cxxi Eban and Meir cited in Shohat (1997: 42)
- cxxii cited in Segev (1998: 170).
- cxxiii Khazzoom (2003: 501).
- cxxiv Gabriel Piterberg (1996), "Domestic Orientalism: The Representation of 'Oriental' Jews," in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Nov96, Vol. 23 Issue 2, pp. 125-146.
- cxxv Shohat (1997: 40).
- cxxvi cited in Piterberg (1996).
- cxxvii Shohat (1997: 43-44)
- cxxviii *ibid* (1997: 45).
- cxxix Raz-Krakotzkin (2005: 174).