

After "Latin" America

territoriality in terms of "la gran co-marca" (see chapter 2) contributes to a trilogy that dismembers the one-to-one relation between the name and the territory, and thus breaks away from the control of meaning (of that name) by those who control epistemic (and not only political and economic) power. Last but not least, "la Frontera" as a key category of Chicano/Latino/a thought – equivalent to "the territory" for ideologues of nation-state categories of thought – further dismantles the Latin and Anglo ideological camps of Simón Bolívar and Thomas Jefferson. Briefly, the old "Latin" America is being remapped as South America, Abya-Yala, La Gran Commarca, and La Frontera.

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Postface: After "America"

At the conclusion of this study, I want the world to recognize, with me, the open door of every consciousness.


Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 1952

"Latin" Americans have historically complained about and resented the US for appropriating the name "America" to refer to itself as a country. Painter Joaquín Torres-García (1874–1949) of Uruguay made a lasting contribution by inverting the content and denaturalizing the image of the Americas,¹ but the silence of missing Indigenous and Afro cartographies remains. Inverting the naturalized view of the Americas, with the South on top, is indeed one important step, but far from being sufficient. It changes the content, not the terms of the conversation. The image of the world upside down was also expressed by Waman Puma de Ayala, but he did not invert the map. Rather, he redraw it from the Andean perspective and with Tawantinsuyu, the fourth part of the world, twice reproduced in the same image (see next page).

His "Pontifical Mundo" ("Pontifical World," rather than "Orbis Universalis Terrarum" – "Universal World" – as Ortelius has it) expresses the imperial/colonial co-existence of the Indies, above, and Castille, below, as Castille is rendered in the same spatial matrix as Tawantinsuyu. In other words, Waman Puma's "world upside down" points toward an-other logic rather than toward an inverted content, as is the case with Torres-García's work.

Why should everybody have their own cartography, you may ask? Why not just accept America for what it is now? Certainly, that is one kind of argument that has been made. This Manifesto intends, precisely, to illuminate how history has produced silences and absences. But there are other arguments, like my own argument here, that are trying to change the terms and not only the content of the conversation. Just as the original naming of the "American" continent occluded all previous territorial designations, so "America" taken as a referent to the US as a country subsumed other countries and realities into an imagined totality. The objection made by "Latin" Americans that "America" is a name that belongs to everyone and not the US alone is justified. The reason, however, for the appropriation of the name by the US is seldom addressed. Why did the hegemonic voices in the US choose to claim "America" as the name of their own country? And what "idea" of America materialized as a consequence of that decision?

What allowed the US to appropriate the name, and thereby to subsume the name of the entire continent under that of only one country, was the same logic as led Christians in the sixteenth century to imagine the "Indias Occidentales" as the fourth continent, redrawing the T-in-O map onto the "Orbis Universalis Terrarum." The same logic, subsequently, also allowed secular Northern Europeans from the eighteenth century onward to name that totality "America" despite the fact that it had not existed as such in the consciousness of its original inhabitants, and even less in the consciousness of African slaves and their descendants. As we have discussed, America, as the fourth continent appended to the Christian cosmology of three, was not an "objective reality." Rather, it was a semantic construction with enormous political, economic, epistemic, and ethical consequences arising from the occlusion of Indigenous conceptualizations of Anáhuac, Tawantinsuyu, Abya-Yala, and other ideas of space. Thus, it is important to underline that it is a name imposed by European Christians, not Aymaras or Muslims. Europeans, at a time when Europe was not just one of four continents but *the* central and privileged one, had the power to name that others did not have. The "idea" of America is not only a reference to a place; above all, it operates on the assumed power and privilege of enunciation that makes it possible to transform an invented idea into "reality." This



The "Pontifical Mundo" is one of the two "maps" that Waman Puma included in his *Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno*. In both of them, Waman Puma followed the spatial logic of Aymara and Kechua thinking and incorporated into it the information provided by the Spanish invaders. In the second "map" Waman Puma redraws Ortelius' "Orbis Universalis Terrarum" and imposed upon it the spatial logic of Tawantinsuyu. In both cases we have a radical displacement of the complicity between geography and epistemology in both the T-in-O and Ortelius' world map. Waman Puma established here a different complicity between spatial conceptualization and epistemology: a clear example of border thinking, the unavoidable condition of colonial subaltern subjects and the potential for decolonial epistemic and political projects. (Courtesy of the

fact has been overlooked as if the continent already had its name inscribed naturally on the face of the earth. "America" did not name itself as such, despite the invisibility of the power relations behind its nomenclature. At work here is the coloniality of knowledge, which appropriates meaning just as the coloniality of power takes authority, appropriates land, and exploits labor.

In the same process, the coloniality of being shaped the subjectivity of the people involved. People, like continents and subcontinents, have been subsumed under overarching European concepts like "Human Being," which was conceived on the empirical evidence and experience of the Christian and White European Man and from that definition, the universality of the Human is defended as the standard over all sort of differences (sex, gender, race, nationalities, languages, etc.). The racial occlusion of differences has its roots in the idea of the "Indias Occidentales" and of "America": the fourth part of the world became, in the prevalent Christian classification of the planet by continent and people attached to continents, the lowest in the scale of human beings, next to Africa. Europe, as we have seen, was for Kant the dwelling place of the White race that, as Hegel later pointed out, migrated to "America" and displaced the Red race. "Latins" in the South were, by the time of US independence, as subsumable as the Indians of Tawantinsuyu and Anáhuac were for Christian Europeans. If it had not been for the invention of "Latin" America as an entity through which European imperial powers could oppose the imperial march of the US, Creoles of Hispanic and Luso descent might not have had their own dwelling place. Indians and Afro descendants, of course, did not have the advantage of imperial help to name the territory after their own political and ethical projects. However, as discussed in chapter 3, the Haitian revolutionaries did manage to change the Spanish and French name back to an Indian name, Aytí; and Indigenous people, today, are living in Abya-Yala and not in "Latin" America. Nevertheless, imperial epistemic privileges remain in place. The universal idea of human being, the universal idea of a planet naturalized on the Christian idea of continental division (founded on the Holy Trinity and its perfunctory reproduction on the three sons of Noah: see chapter 1), and the idea that a continent can be subsumed by one country are three distinct moments and

aspects of imperial knowledge formation through the logic of coloniality.

Control of money and control of meaning and being are parallel processes. Out of the top ten universities in the world, seven are in the US and three in Europe. If control of meaning and knowledge is concentrated in the ten top universities that produce the leaders of tomorrow's world, control of money is concentrated in the same geo-historical location. Almost 48 percent of major corporations and banks are located in the US and Europe. Ten percent are in Japan and the remaining 40 percent are scattered all over the world. If the geo-politics of economy is concentrated in three locales, with Japan having significantly less economic power, and the control of knowledge is located in Europe and the US, then talking about "deterritorialization" and a "floating" empire only masks the fact that the geo-politics of knowledge and economy remains anchored firmly in the West. Note, I use the term "geo-politics of economy" and not "political economy" because this term can only tell part of the story, the story of Western capitalism as seen by its own agents and intellectuals. Alongside the economic and epistemic hegemony is the simultaneous control of authority, state, and army. Out of around two hundred countries in the world today, most of them weakened by globalization, those of the G8 (mainly the US and the Atlantic axis of the European imperial countries of the past five hundred years) become stronger every day.

Today, the idea of "Latin" America is that of a dependent sub-continent that is subaltern to the continental totality, America. In the 1898 war with Spain – an empire in decline – political leaders, historians, and geographers in the US – an empire on the rise – began to twist the former European imperial mechanisms and strategies to their own ends.² The racial discourse that justified the war against Spain relied on selling the inferiority of "Latin" Americans as White but not White enough. In the war, the US played two roles: it was not only a *rising empire* fighting a declining one but also a *consolidated nation* that could take advantage of the two remaining Spanish colonies wanting to become nation-states, Puerto Rico and Cuba. It is precisely this double role that would allow for the identification of the country of the US with the continent.

The end of the Cold War started a new form of imperialism (but certainly within the same logic as the previous Spanish and British ones) led by the US. Celebrated as the end of history, the collapse of the Soviet Union was, in the long run, more of a problem than a solution for the US as new imperial leader of the capitalist world (once again, like Spain and England in the past). After the Cold War, it has increasingly become more difficult to contain the proliferation of knowledges and ideologies that differ from the hegemonic. They can no longer be easily packed into one enemy (communism). The US tried to substitute Islamism for communism, but the rules of the game were no longer the same. Perhaps the ideologies of "enemy substitution" simply missed the fact that *communism is part of and operates under the same logic as Christian and liberal modernity, with a difference only in content. Islam, on the contrary, operates under a different logic.* The misunderstanding that arises from ignoring that difference is at the root of the irrational war against Iraq. While things look bleak now (after the re-election of President George W. Bush and with the mounting numbers of dead Iraqi people in a war without justification), the problems faced by the US may actually be good for the rest of the world insofar as the drive to subsume the planet under one logic is being challenged.

It is precisely in the climate of fear provoked by that possibility that Samuel Huntington's two books, *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) and *Who Are We?* (2004), found their raison d'être. Both books document the fear experienced most intensely by right-wing, Protestant, and White political elites that they will lose the economic and epistemic privileges that they have accumulated over two hundred and forty years. In other words, Huntington's fears are not merely his personally but reflect the feelings of those who currently "own" the state (that is, the US) and have the privilege of "being" the nation. A strong sense of property (economic and political capital) entitlement supports the fear and racism that are shared today by a large portion of the country's population. The Islamic world threatens the security of "the American people" by subjecting them to the possibility of mass slaughter at some unexpected moment, but the menace is constantly resuscitated to maintain a level of fear and to justify the government's right to operate at will on the basis of that fear. The Hispanics, on the other hand, are a long-term metaphorical bomb,

according to Huntington. No, I am not saying Hispanics are terrorists. Huntington fears, rather, the subtle erosion of the Anglo, White, and Protestant identity by the non-assimilation of "Latinos," who are presumably Catholics and of color or not quite White. Of course, this is a simplification. Of the 44 percent of Latinos/as that voted for President Bush in the last election, there was a good proportion of Evangelicals and Pentecostals, two branches of Protestantism that have been gaining significant ground in Spanish and Luso America (although not necessarily in the Black, Anglo, and French Caribbean). Nevertheless, in spite of a significant number of "Hispanics" voting Republican, Huntington's fears do not dissolve: They may vote Republican but still they are Hispanics!

What Huntington should fear most (if he does not already) is not that "Latinos/as" are not assimilating. Some do, some don't. The real problem is what I would like to call "Anzaldúa's threat," which is epistemic. Gloria Anzaldúa's theoretical revolution, in the US, equivalent (at different level) to the Zapatistas' theoretical revolution in Chiapas, began to erode all the sacred scientific principles, ideological convictions, and body reactions under which Huntington, a serious political theorist playing the game of scientific objectivity, operates. Thus, Latinos/as puzzle Huntington for the same reasons as Islam escapes understanding in the dominant paradigms. Yes, "Latinos/as" or "Hispanics" of Spanish and Luso descent are all children of European colonialism and its system of education, from school to university, from the family to the church. But we belong to the Latin language's version of history and mode of being and, as Anzaldúa realized, we are all related closely to the Indigenous and Afro populations because we share in different ways the colonial wound. Additionally, as I showed in chapter 3, Afros and Indians in South America are not depending any more on generous "recognition" by Latin or Anglo Whites and have begun to carve their own epistemic paths. In sum, what was once a nice package of communist enemies today is exploding, literally and metaphorically, into hundreds of political projects coming from the experience and the anger of the *dámnés*, coming, that is, from the *colonial wound*.

The colonial wound, like the polis for Aristotle, the city-state for Machiavelli, or the emergent bourgeois commercial and civilized

bottom line is that the North has been constructed as the leader of the South and the "natural" location of economic, political, military, and epistemic power. In general, given the economic status of the United States, "America" seems to still conform to Hegel's idea of a "natural" division between North and South. Indeed, for Europe and the US, South America provides a location for investment in natural resources and cheap labor as well as a cheap and exotic place for tourism. For European and US state politics, it is a place to establish alliances in favor of the G8. And if we maintain the idea of "Latin" America as a set of homogeneous countries, a civilization as Huntington would have it, the subcontinental unity joins Africa and Central Asia as one of three regions of the world with an enormous wealth of natural resources matched by growing poverty and misery.

However, "Latin" America today is also being transformed by left-oriented states (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, mainly) that are emerging after the Cold War, different from previous leftist governments like Fidel Castro's Cuba, to challenge the continued application of the nineteenth-century idea of the Americas. At the level of the state, the path initiated by Hugo Chávez, Ignacio Lula, Nestor Kirchner, and Tabaré Vázquez seems to indicate an alliance of Atlantic countries moving toward the left. Hugo Chávez has returned to the ideas of Simón Bolívar and of a República Bolivariana that preceded the imperial invasion of the French and differ completely from the nineteenth-century idea of "Latin" America. Likewise, the Andean countries, as I insinuated in chapter 3, are becoming less and less "Latin" American, as Indigenous and Afro-Andean social movements make their presence felt and Indigenous people take an active role in state and local politics. The idea of Afro-Latinidad has already been accepted to describe people of Afro-American descent who speak Spanish and Portuguese rather than English, and who live in continental South America rather than in the British Caribbean and North America.⁴ Last but not least, if Lula da Silva's project to constitute a Southern cell of the "G3" (Brazil, South Africa, and India) prospers, there will be still another reason to believe that "Latin" America is an idea that has run its course and can no longer be sustained.

Nor will it be necessary to sustain this idea. MERCOSUR (a trading bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with Bolivia and Chile as its associate members) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, the US, and Canada) illustrate the two competing poles of the situation. MERCOSUR turns to the South and has Brazil as a leading force. Brazil was marginal to the idea of "Latin" America and had remained until now as the younger brother of the family, albeit a quite large and very rich little brother. MERCOSUR establishes an "American" alliance that does not depend on the North. NAFTA and the Plan Puebla-Panama,⁵ on the other hand, put Mexico in a tense position in relation to the family of "Latin" American countries, insofar as it is considered "North American" and an ally of the United States in facilitating US exportation, but still remains "Latin" and marginal to North America. Mexico's tenuous relation to the US is complicated by matters of immigration and the displacement of maquiladoras (or subcontractors) as the US moves to China and East Asia looking for cheaper wages. However, the Zapatista opposition to NAFTA and state policies shows that within Mexico there is a demand to change the traditional relation of the country to its Northern neighbor. The paradox today is that Hegel's idea of the Americas is being inverted: the growing organization of Indian and Afro social movements, the increasing philosophical, theoretical, and ethical inquiries in the Caribbean and in continental South America, and the growing numbers of states turning toward the left all indicate that democracy and respect for human rights are increasing in the South, while totalitarianism, violation of human rights, the use of violence to achieve domination, and extreme conservatism are on the rise in the North. History, which has not ended yet, will let us know, perhaps sooner than anticipated, what will come "after Latin America" and "after America."

The tectonic shift in progress is being enacted by the diversity of Indigenous epistemic, political, and economic projects – from the Mapuches in Chile to the Fourth Nation in Canada, with Native Americans in between – that do not respect the division between Latin and Anglo America, and think even less of the idea of an America that encompasses all other "Americas." Likewise, the rich diversity among people across the "Americas" of African descent,

city for Hobbes, makes visible the experiences and subjectivities that shape a way of thinking, which, in this case, leads to a pluriversality of paradigms that are no longer subsumable under the linear history of Western thought, managed as a totality from imperial institutions that control meaning and money. The proliferation of other paradigms can no longer be determined by universal liberating projects, be they the theology of liberation or Marxism. Why would Islamic progressive intellectuals wait to be liberated by Christian theologians? Why would Afros in South America and the Caribbean, and Indians from Chile to Canada, want to be liberated following a Marxist blue-print for revolution? Cannot there be salvation from neo-liberalism outside of Christianity and Marxism (or Europe, as Jacques Derrida, Slavov Žižek, and Susan George would argue)? The explosions coming out of the theoretical, political, and ethical awareness of the *colonial wound* make possible the imagination and construction of an-other world, a world in which many worlds are possible. Examples of the practical implementation of that future are coming from South America (the Zapatistas, Amawtzy Wasi, the World Social Forum, the Social Forum of the Americas, the Cumbre de los Pueblos Indígenas) and from Latinos/as in the US. The imperial/colonial economic, political, and military power is still in the hands of Washington. However, *decolonization of knowledge and of being* (and more generally, of politics and the economy) cannot be thought out and implemented other than from the perspective of the *damnés* (and not from those of the World Bank or from an updated Marxism or a refreshed Christianity); that is, from the perspective, provided by years of modern/colonial injustices, inequalities, exploitation, humiliation, and the humiliations and pains of the colonial wound, of an-other world where creative care for human beings and the celebration of life will take precedence over individual success and meritocracy, and accumulation of money and of meaning (e.g., personal CVs, the personal satisfaction of celebrity, and all other ways in which alienation is being reproduced and encouraged). The imperial perspective (advanced and implemented by European and US men and institutions) cannot find the solution for the problems of the world created because of imperial designs and desires. Las Casas and Marx are necessary, but far from being sufficient. They should not only be complemented by Waman Puma,

Fanon, and Anzaldúa; their very critical foundation should be displaced. The "idea of Latin" America and the "idea of America (as the US)" came into being in the process of building the modern/colonial imaginary and the colonial matrix of power organized through the colonial and the imperial (epistemic) differences. Huntington's fears are justified as he sees history taking the US toward a non-White, non-Anglo future. The silences and absences of history are speaking their presence; the rumor of the disinherited can no longer be controlled, in spite of desperate moves like Huntington's, and its remarkable marketing success.

How to imagine a world "after Latin" America and "after America as the US," and the place of a continent that lies at the foundation of the modern/colonial world? Indigenous peoples' claims for the renaming of their dwelling place implies the reinscription of Waman Puma's cartographic logic. Abya-Yala is not just an inversion of the existing maps, but a questioning of the very nature of the existing maps. In 1570, around the same time Ortelius was publishing his "Orbis Universalis Terrarum," López de Velasco (Philip II's official chronicler, in charge of mapping the "Indias Occidentales," and manager of the famous questionnaire called *Relaciones geográficas de Indias*) took it for granted that the Isthmus of Panama was the natural division between the Southern and Northern parts of the "Indias Occidentales." About two hundred and fifty years later, the name of the continent was no longer "Indias Occidentales" but "America," and Hegel – directly or indirectly – followed López de Velasco's assumption and added that the natural division corresponded to an inherent difference between the people of the two parts, in which the South provided natural resources and cheap labor while the North (according to both Hegel and Alexis de Tocqueville after him) was the land of democracy and human rights. Obviously, the division of the two Americas between Latins and Anglos was not yet in sight when López de Velasco, ignoring Indigenous territorial mapping, established a division of the continent based on his own cartographic memory.

As we also saw in chapter 2, the supposed South of "America" was correlated in the nineteenth century with the inferior South of Europe, which was "tainted" by Catholicism and the infusion of Moorish blood, thus further degrading the South of America. The

who speak Spanish, Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, and Creole and practice Santería, Voodoo, Candomblé, Rasafarianism, and varieties of Christianity, is not contained by an "Anglo" or "Latin" American identity or political projects in the name of "Latinidad" or "Anglicidad." Furthermore, the Latinos/as have been making the borderland, rather than the territory of the nation-state, the location of their subjectivity. Some Latins in the South confront these struggles and are threatened while others are joining forces with Latinos/as, Afros, and Indigenous people and working in solidarity on common projects. Thus an "intracultural dialogue," to use an expression learned from Afro-Colombian activist Libia Grueso, is taking place among political projects originating in diverse but parallel experiences of the colonial wound. Intracultural dialogue among subaltern projects and communities generates intercultural struggles with the state and institutions managing the spheres of the social (economics, politics, gender and sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge).

Geo-political identities, it seems, have not been the concern of women until recently. You can certainly go to Google and type "woman, writer in Latin America" and find an enormous amount of information; but it will be more difficult to find a significant number of texts by women in which the idea of "Latin" America has been called into question. It would be interesting to explore why subcontinental identity has traditionally been more of a male than a female question. Where women made interventions, since the nineteenth century, was at the level of the nation and of national culture, both in "Latin" and in "Anglo" America. That is, they were mainly women of European descent, from either Latin or Anglo countries. The situation has changed in the years since the early 1970s, when gender and ethnicity on the one hand, and patriarchy and racism on the other, have risen to new levels of concern and struggle, as we see clearly in the work of Anzaldúa. Feminist scholarly and political projects (consider those of Anzaldúa and Sylvia Wynter among many others not mentioned here) cut across the distinction between "Latin" and "Anglo" America from a different angle. If "Latin" and "Anglo" America are both patriarchal, feminist geo-political concerns today are global and transnational, rather than subcontinental, ones. Indigenous women in Ecuador, for example,

will create alliances in Ecuador and the Andean countries, and also with Indigenous women in Canada or Australia. Black Caribbean women, whether with French, British, or Spanish colonial legacies, are joining forces, on the one hand, with Black men against racism and, on the other, with Indigenous and White women against patriarchy. The idea of a "Latin" and "Anglo" America is, more often than not, an impediment to decolonial movements, as both subcontinental identities connote the sphere of state and imperial power rather than decolonial struggles.

"After America" is a process and a continental movement that is eroding the ethnic (Latin/Anglo) and geographic (North/South) frontiers. I began with the T-in-O map translated into Mercator's and Ortellius' "Orbis Universalis Terrarum." Thus, I finish with the radical dislocation of the Americas and of Latin America by Waman Puma, who translated *Pachakuti* as "the world upside down." He, too, drew his own map, not by following Ortellius but by updating Andean cosmology to account for a world that was not only turned upside down by the Spaniards but had, like the one around us, become a world where different logics co-exist(ed), although linked by the colonial matrix of power differentials.

Thus, for the future continental imaginary, the Americas upside down (placing "Latin" on top of "Anglo" America) won't do any longer. A change in content without questioning the logic is necessary but far from being sufficient. An "epistemology of the South" should take a second step, blurring the memories of a planet divided into four continents, and promote a process of critical border thinking, an epistemology in which people of Afro descent in the Americas as well as the whole diversity of Indigenous people in the South, Native Americans in the US, and the Fourth Nation in Canada have much to say. We are, indeed, in the middle of a seismic shift that CNN and the BBC are not reporting (and perhaps not yet quite understanding). The diverse social movements connected by the word and web address "noalca" ("No to ALCA - Área Libre Comercio de las Américas") close each of their public statements with the expression: *Otra América es posible* ("An other América is possible"). Waman Puma's map, and his *Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno*, become, like Niccolò Machiavelli for the history of Europe, a point of reference for the Other América of the future and for

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the decolonial task of the present. They join forces with Frantz Fanon's dictum – "At the conclusion of this study, I want the world to recognize, with me, the open door of every consciousness" – and with Latina Gloria Anzaldúa's conjecture:

*En unas pocas centurias, the future will belong to the mestiza. Because the future depends on the breaking down of paradigms, it depends on the straddling of two or more cultures. By creating a new mythos – that is, a change in the way we perceive reality, the way we see ourselves, and the ways we behave – la mestiza creates a new consciousness.*⁶

Notes

Preface: Uncoupling the Name and the Reference

- 1 Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- 2 Arturo Escobar, "World and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Research Program," *Cuadernos del CEDLA*, 16 (2004), 31–67.
- 3 For the European reader unfamiliar with this term, "Chicanos" and "Latinos" (the canonical forms) are terms of self-identification by a population in the US of Mexican descent and Caribbean descent, respectively. "Latinos" has been generalized and includes "Chicanos," without erasing the particular history of each group (c.g., Puerto Rican, Cubans, Mexicans). Furthermore, the strong intervention of women has led to the need, because of the gender markers in the Spanish language, to speak of "Latinos/as." All these variations are, as I have said, self-identification, in contrast with the identification "Hispanics," which was imposed from above by the Anglo-government of Richard Nixon.
- 4 For the question of "nature" in the imperial Spanish mentality, see my "Commentaries" to José de Acosta's *Natural and Moral History of the Indies*, trans. Frances López-Morilla, ed. Jane E. Mangan. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002, pp. 451–519. For a current view on the question of "nature" and "Latin," see Arturo Escobar, *El final del salvaje: Naturaleza, cultura y política en la antropología contemporánea*. Bogotá: CEREC, 1989; and Gabriela Nouzeilles, ed., *La naturaleza en*